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Articles
The Interstate Compact on Adult
Offender Supervision: Using Old Tools
to Solve New Problems
Michael L. Buenger* and Richard L. Masters**
[Miost questions of interstate concern are beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; they are beyond all court
relief Legislation is the answer, and legislation must be
coterminous with the region requiringcontrol.... With all
our unifying processes nothing is clearer than that in the
United States there are being built up regional interests,
regionalcultures, and regional interdependencies.,

* B.A., cum laude, University of Dayton, 1983; J.D., cum laude, St.
Louis University School of Law, 1989. State Courts Administrator, Missouri.
President, National Conference of State Court Administrators. Member,
Drafting Team on the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and
the Interstate Juvenile Compact.
** B.A., Asbury College, 1976; J.D., Louis D. Brandeis School of Law of
the University of Louisville, 1979. Special Counsel to the Council of State
Governments (CSG); Professor of Business Law, Asbury College; Private
Practice; Principal Draftsman, Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision; CSG consultant with the U.S. Department of Justice/National Institute of Corrections and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
for the purpose of the amendment of two national corrections compacts.
1. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution- A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 707, 708
(1925).
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They are arcane, sometimes complicated, little understood,
and frequently overlooked. Many lawyers and most citizens have
little knowledge of them and virtually no understanding of how
they affect our daily lives. They are seldom the subjects of celebrated litigation except, perhaps, in that unusual circumstance of
states suing other states under the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court. 2 Ask lawyers or law students how
much time they have spent studying them and the likely answer is
scant to none. They operate in that gray area of the Constitution
involving issues of regional or national importance that do not fall
within the immediate purview of the federal government, yet
clearly rest beyond the realm of the states acting individually. Additionally, in recent years they have quietly emerged as an increasingly effective vehicle by which the states retain policy
control over regional and national issues, preserve their sovereignty to act on such issues, and preempt federal interference.
Throughout the history of the United States, interstate compacts have been used to define and redefine the relationships of
states and the federal government on a broad range of issues.
Compacts, instruments recognized by the Constitution, 3 address

2. The Supreme Court has exercised its original jurisdiction in suits between states very sparingly. The general standard for invocation of the
Court's original jurisdiction is that the "dispute between States [is] of such
seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign." Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18 (1983); see also New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) ("Before this court can be moved to
exercise its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights
must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence."); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) ("It
has long been this Court's philosophy that 'our original jurisdiction should be
invoked sparingly.'" (quoting Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969)));
California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 615 n.15 (1978) ("The status of unsatisfied
creditor does not necessarily create the kind of controversy between States
that can or should be resolved by means of adjudication under this Court's
original jurisdiction. This may, rather, be the kind of dispute that is best resolved by the contending States through negotiation or arbitration."); cf
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943), cited infra note 10.
3. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides, in
part:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
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matters that are "supra-state," "sub-federal" in scope. 4 There are
some 196 compacts in effect today with still others being drafted
or under consideration.5 Most recently, forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia adopted the Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS).6 The ICAOS seeks to define the relaPower, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Id. (emphasis added). Interstate compacts have also been used to define the
relationship between the states and the federal government. See, e.g., Interstate Agreement on Detainers, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-481 (2003) (designating
the federal government as a signatory); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 580.20
(McKinney 1997) (same); National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14611-14665 (West 2003) (creating a governance structure to
oversee the interstate use of criminal justice information for non-criminal
justice purposes, and designating the federal government as a signatory).
4. One scholar has described the realm of compacts as addressing those
issues that are "supra-state" but "sub-national" in nature. See generally VINCENT V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT (Public Affairs Press 1953). The authors submit that the characterization of "sub-national" is no longer valid. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, states used compacts to resolve problems that were unequivocally
national in scope but did not fall within the immediate realm of the federal
government. See, e.g., Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision
(hereinafter ICAOS], http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact%20
Language.pdf; Interstate Agreement on Detainers, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-481
(2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney 1997); Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7900 (West 2001); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-13-01 (2002); Driver License Compact, THE MVR BOOK 331
(BRB Publications, Inc. 2003), available at http://www.dui.com/DLC/driver
_license compact.html; see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 40 (1994) ("A compact accorded congressional consent 'is more than a
supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region .... [I]t is
also a means of safeguarding the national interest. . . .'" (quoting West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951) (first alteration in original)).
The more appropriate characterization of the issues addressed by interstate
compacts is "supra-state, sub-federal" because many issues have national implications and yet do not fall within the immediate purview of the federal
government.
5. The Council of State Governments (CSG), Interstate Compact Statutes/Legislation, (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://www.csg.org/CSG/Pro
grams/interstate+compacts/compact+laws.htm.
6. As of October 22, 2003, the following jurisdictions have enacted
ICAOS: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,

74 ROGER WILLIAMS UNWERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol.9:71

tionship of the states regarding the interstate movement and supervision of adult criminal offenders (adult offenders). 7 The
Wyoming. Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Status, Member States
& Status (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.adultcompact.org/Member%20States
.htm. The compact is under consideration in Massachusetts. Id. Only Virginia
and Mississippi are not currently considering the compact, though they will
likely reintroduce it in 2004. Id.
7. The term "adult offender," as used in the ICAOS, embraces all classes
of offenders including those on probation, parole, or in pre-trial or alternative
sentencing status. See infra note 130. The ICAOS is a replacement for the
1937 Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers.
See ICAOS pmbl., supra note 4. Congress created the original interstate compact on adult parolees and probationers pursuant to a specific grant of consent under the 1934 Crime Control Act. Pub. L. No. 293, 68 Stat. 909 (1934).
The Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers provided:
Entered into by and among the contracting states, signatories
hereto, with the consent of the Congress of the United States of
America, granted by an act entitled "An act granting the consent of
Congress to any two or more states to enter agreements or compacts
for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of
crime and for other purposes."
The contracting states solemnly agree:
(1) That it shall be competent for the duly constituted judicial and
administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (hereto
called "sending state"), to permit any person convicted of an offense
within such state and placed on probation or released on parole to
reside in any other state party to this compact (hereto called "receiving state"), while on probation or parole if:
(a) Such person is in fact a resident of or has his family residing
within the receiving state and can obtain employment there;
(b) Though not a resident of the receiving state and not having
his family residing there, the receiving state consents to such a
person being sent there. Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be granted to the receiving state to investigate the
home and prospective employment of such person. A resident of
the receiving state, within the meaning of this section, is one
who has been an actual inhabitant of such state continuously for
more than one year prior to his coming to the sending state and
has not resided within the sending state more than six continuous months immediately preceding the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted.
(2) That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of
and supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state
and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same
standards that prevail for its own probationers and parolees.
(3) That duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times
enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person
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ICAOS is more than just another interstate compact, however. By
creating a particularized intermediate governing authority that is
truly supra-state, sub-federal in its purpose, the ICAOS advances
the administrative control and enforcement powers of compacts to

on probation or parole. For that purpose no formalities will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer and the
identity of the persons to be retaken. All legal requirements to extradition of fugitives from justice are hereby expressly waived on the
part of states party hereto, as to such persons.
The decision of the sending state to retake a person on probation or
parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, provided, however, that if at the time when a state seeks to
retake a probationer or parolee there should be pending against him
within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he should be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, he
shall not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state until
discharged from prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense.
(4) That the duly accredited officers of the sending state will be permitted to transport prisoners being retaken through any and all
states parties to this compact, without interference.
(5) That the governor of each state may designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other contracting states, if and when
appointed, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
deemed necessary to more effectively carry out the terms of this
compact.
(6) That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its
execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so
executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of
law within such state, the form of execution to be in accordance with
the laws of the executing state.
(7) That this compact shall continue to force and remain binding
upon each executing state until renounced by it. The duties and obligations hereunder of a renouncing state shall continue as to parolees
or probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged by the sending state. Renunciation of this
compact shall be by the same authority which executed it, by sending six months' notice in writing of its intention to withdraw from
the compact to the other state party hereto.
Section 2. If any section, sentence, subdivision or clause of this act is
for any reason held invalid or to be unconstitutional, such decision
shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.
Section 3. Whereas an emergency exists for the immediate taking effect of this act, the same shall become effective immediately upon its
passage.
Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers (1937),
http://www.adultcompact.org/Original%2OCompact%20-%201937.pdf.
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a new level. 8 While the creation of such an intermediate governing
authority may raise important federalism questions, the use of
such administrative authorities is becoming a practical necessity
today if traditional notions of state autonomy are to be preserved.
With the fundamental principle of state sovereignty increasingly
brought into question by the economic, social, governmental and
political integration of the United States, interstate compacts
modeled after the ICAOS may well provide an effective vehicle
through which states can act jointly on a broad range of regional
and national issues while preserving their autonomy within the
federal framework of the government. 9
I. COMPACTS AND FEDERALISM

Over the years, usually on their own initiative, but sometimes
at the urging of the federal government, state legislatures have
adopted compacts to address a wide range of issues. 10 In the early
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. As early as 1925 compacts were recognized as an important instrument in addressing many of the regional and national problems that had begun to emerge in the United States. See generally Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 1.
10. See 4 U.S.C.S. § 112 (Law. Co-op. 2002) ("[c]ompacts between States
for cooperation in prevention of crime"); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1358 (Law. Co-op.
1993) ("[cjonsent of Congress for interstate compacts"); 23 U.S.C.A.
§ 134(d)(2) (West 2002) (granting congressional consent for states to enter
into compacts for cooperation in metropolitan planning); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5196(h) (West 1995) ("[i]nterstate emergency preparedness compacts"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 673a (West 2003).
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall take all possible
steps to encourage and assist the various States to enter into interstate compacts (which are hereby approved by the Congress) under
which the interests of any adopted child with respect to whom an
adoption assistance agreement has been entered into by a State under section 673 of this title will be adequately protected, on a reasonable and equitable basis which is approved by the Secretary, if
and when the child and his or her adoptive parent (or parents) move
to another State.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021d(2) (West 1994) (encouraging low-level radiation

waste disposal compacts). The Supreme Court has also encouraged the use of
compacts as a means for resolving interstate problems for which a judicially
enforceable solution is not readily available. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320

U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of
States in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present compli-
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years of the Republic, compacts were used primarily to resolve
boundary, jurisdictional, and trade disputes." The resolution of
such disputes was the exclusive purpose of all but one of the approximately thirty-six compacts enacted before 1921.12 In modern
times, however, compacts are emerging as an effective tool for addressing a broad range of interstate issues that rest outside the
traditional confines of the federal government. 13 Almost any matter between two or more states that is supra-state, sub-federal in
scope can become the subject of an interstate compact. 14 For example, compacts are being used to tackle problems regarding wa-

cated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future
change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than
judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant
to the compact clause of the federal Constitution.
Id.; cf Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1909); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273, 283 (1920).
11. See, e.g., Virginia-North Carolina Boundary Agreement of 1791, VA.
CODE ANN. § 7.1-4 (Michie 1999); Virginia-Maryland Boundary Compact of
1786, VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-7 (Michie 1999); Virginia-Kentucky Boundary
Agreement of 1800, VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-6 (Michie 1999); see also Maryland
v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 577, 578-82 (1910) (discussing how the VirginiaMaryland Boundary Compact had an impact on the border between Virginia
and the District of Columbia).
12.

THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

34 THE BOOK

OF THE STATES

47

(2002).
13. Although in recent years interstate compacts have been used to address a wide range of issues, they are still used to settle boundary disputes.
Recently, Congress has consented to boundary compacts between several
states. Pub. L. No. 106-90, 113 Stat. 1307 (1999) (granting congressional consent "to the establishment of the boundary between the States of Georgia and
South Carolina"); Pub. L. No. 106-101, 113 Stat. 1333 (1999) (granting the
consent of Congress "to the Missouri-Nebraska Boundary Compact"); Pub. L.
No. 106-288, 114 Stat. 919 (2000) (granting the consent of Congress "to the
Red River Compact entered into between the States of Texas and Oklahoma").
14. One author has suggested that compacts are intended to address "supra-state, sub-national" issues. See THURSBY, supra note 4. However, the notion of compacts being restricted to "supra-state, sub-national" issues is being
challenged by such compacts as the ICAOS. Compacts can be an effective tool
for addressing multi-state issues that have national consequence. States can
also use compacts as a means to preempt federal usurpation of matters that
are traditionally within the purview of the states. The authors suggest that
the more appropriate characterization of interstate compacts is that they address issues that are "supra-state," but "sub-federal" in nature.
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ter management, 15 nuclear waste disposal,'16 the building of interstate transportation links, 7 regional economic development and
regional planning, 8 the placement of children and juveniles,19
education, 20 mental health treatment, 2' crime control, 22 insurance
regulation, 23 and pollution control.24 Of the approximately 200
compacts in effect today, some 150 have been adopted in the last

15. E.g., Pecos River Compact, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19 (Michie
1978); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 2000); Snake River Compact,
IDAHO CODE § 42-3401 (Michie 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-501 (Michie
2003); Upper Colo. River Basin Compact, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 45-1321 (2003).
16. E.g., Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Compact, ALA. CODE § 22-32-1 (1997); Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Compact, IND. CODE ANN. § 13-29-1-1 (West 1998); Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management., ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.45.010 (Michie 2002).
17. E.g., Woodrow Wilson Bridge Compact, D.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1115.01
(2001); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 10-303 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1320.2 (Michie 1950).
18. E.g., Bi-State Development Agency Compact, 45 ILL. COMP. STAT.
100/0.011 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 70.370 (1998); Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66800 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 227.200 (Michie 2002); Chickasaw Trail Economic Development Compact,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 57-36-1 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-2-301 (1999); New
York-New Jersey Port Auth. Compact, N.J. REV. STAT. § 32:1-1 (1990); N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAw § 6401 (McKinney 2000).
19. E.g., Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7900 (West 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-13-01 (2002).
20. E.g., Interstate Compact for Western Regional Cooperation in Higher
Education, HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 310-2 (Michie 2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 397.020 (Michie 1998); Midwestern Higher Education Compact, 45
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 155/1 (1993); MICH. Comp. LAws § 390.1531 (1994).
21. E.g., Interstate Compact on Mental Health, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135-A:1 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43a, § 6-201 (1998).
22. E.g., Interstate Agreement on Detainers, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-481
(2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 580.20 (McKinney 1997); ICAOS,
http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact%2OLanguage.pdf.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is notable because it is one of the few interstate agreements to which the federal government is also a signatory. For a
brief history on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, see United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1978).
23. E.g., Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-6501 (1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 601.59 (West Supp. 2002).
24. E.g., Arkansas River Basin Compact, ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-23-401
(Michie 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1421 (1990); Delaware River Basin Compact, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1974); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 815.101
(1997); New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 492 (West 1964); Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation
Compact, IND. CODE ANN. § 13-29-2-1 (West 1998).

2003] INTERSTATE COMPACT ONADULT OFFENDERS

79

seventy-five years, mainly on matteri unrelated to state boundaries and usually involving some interstate regulatory matter. Like
the ICAOS, several of these compacts create ongoing administrative agencies to manage compact matters and address a wide vari25
ety of state concerns.
A. The Origin of Compacts
The ICAOS is part of a long heritage of managing interstate
relations using the compact device. Compacts are one of the oldest
mechanisms available to promote formal interstate cooperation,
predating the founding of the United States. 26 Well before the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution, colonial authorities used a variety of mechanisms similar to
compacts to resolve various disputes. 27 Many inter-colonial disputes resulted from boundary controversies arising from the vari28
ous royal land charters under which the colonies were founded.
These charters were, by definition and operation, vague and expansive, applying to lands that lacked adequate surveys and the
possession of which was questionable. 29 Moreover, as their popula25. E.g., Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-6501, art. III, §§ 1-5 (providing for the establishment of the "Interstate
Insurance Receivership Commission").
26. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 692-95. For a more general discussion on the use of other formal and informal administrative
agreements between states, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS

(2002).

27. Frankfurter and Landis observed that, "[tihe story of these disputes,
their final outcome and the resulting territorial changes, concern the historian; the methods evolved for settlement are of prime importance to the lawyer." Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 692.
28. Of particular interest is the dispute that arose between Virginia and
Tennessee contesting the borders of those two states relative to the original
colonial charters establishing Virginia and North Carolina under the Virginia-North Carolina Boundary Compact of 1803. See Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 528 (1893) (affirming the boundary line established by the 1803
compact); see also infra note 29 (regarding the border dispute between Massachusetts and Rhode Island as illustrated in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. 657 (1838)).
29. For example, the Plymouth Charter of 1628 to Sir Henry Rosewell
gave a tract of land described as:
[AIlI that part of New England, in America, aforesaid, which lies and
extends between a great river there, commonly called Monomack,
alias Merrimac, and a certain other river, there called Charles river,
being in the bottom of a certain bay, there commonly called Massa-
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tions migrated further west; Atlantic coast colonies made extravagant-and at times conflicting-claims to portions of the interior
continent based, in part, on broad royal land charters and, in part,
on the notion that possession was nine-tenths of the law. As a consequence of the vagueness of these claims, boundary disputes between the colonies were inevitable.30 Resolution of these disputes
generally occurred by negotiations through a joint commission,
which then submitted a proposed written resolution to the king for
approval.31 The origin of the compact device is grounded in this
approach to inter-colonial dispute resolution, which incorporated
negotiation followed by written documentation of the resolution,
and approval from the crown.

chusetts, alias Mattachusetts, alias Massatusetts, bay; and, also, all
and singular those lands and hereditaments, whatsoever, lying
within the space of three English miles on the south part of the said
Charles river, or of any or every part thereof: and, also, all and singular the lands and hereditaments, whatsoever, lying and being
within the space of three English miles to the southward of the
southernmost part of the said bay, called Massachusetts, alias Mattachusetts, alias Massatusetts bay; and, also, all those lands and hereditaments, whatsoever, which lie and be within the space of three
English miles to the northward of the said river, called Monomack,
alias Merrimac, or to the northward of any and every part thereof,
and all lands and hereditaments, whatsoever, lying within the limits
aforesaid, north and south in latitude and breadth, and in length
and longitude of and within all the breadth aforesaid, throughout
the main lands there, from the Atlantic and western sea and ocean
on the east part, to the South sea on the west part.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1838). This charter and
its subsequent amendments formed part of the basis for Rhode Island's lawsuit against Massachusetts concerning the boundary between the two states.
See generally id.
30. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 692.
31. Each colony was directly related to the king through various royal
land charters. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-1 (Michie 2002) (reciting the
early history of Virginia and the king's various grants and charters). As such,
inter-colonial disputes and the agreements resolving them had to be submitted to the King's Privy Council for approval. Colonies could not resolve such
matters between themselves without the approval of the Council. See generally THURSBY, supra note 4. On several occasions the Privy Council was required to settle a number of colonial border disputes. In 1727, the Council
resolved a dispute between Rhode Island and Connecticut; this was followed
by cases between New Hampshire and Massachusetts in 1740 and between
Rhode Island and Massachusetts in 1746. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 1, at 692 n.29.
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Arguably, based on their colonial experience, the Founders
acknowledged two important principles early in the evolution of
the nation's governing structure: (1) that the federal structure of
the nation-a large multistate system comprised of independent
and autonomous political entities joined in a national unionrequired a "state-based" methodology for joint action to resolve interstate disputes; and (2) that some form of national control over
joint action was essential to maintaining the integrity of the newly
established union. Thus, while recognizing the need for formal interstate agreements, the Founders, like the British before them,
foresaw the need to control joint state actions-actions that could
prove highly detrimental to the prerogatives of the newly formed
national government.
In drafting the Articles of Confederation, therefore, the Founders restricted the ability of the states to join in formal, common
enterprises or allegiances. The Articles of Confederation recognized that each state retained "its sovereignty, freedom and independence ... "32 They also, however, restricted the states by
providing that no state could enter "any treaty, confederation or
alliance whatever between them, without the consent.., of Con-

gress.

.

... 33

This congressional "consent" requirement was a

counterweight (not unlike the colonies obtaining consent from the
crown) against joint state action at the expense of the national
government's viability and sovereignty.34 Moreover, the concern
over joint action was so compelling that the drafters of the Articles

32. Articles of Confederation, art. II (U.S. 1781) ("Each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled.").
33. Id. art. IV ("No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for
which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.").
34. It is important to note that under the Articles of Confederation the
national government had very little power, and what power it did possess
was concentrated primarily in the area of foreign relations. See Frankfurter
& Landis, supra note 1, at 694. Even the power it possessed regarding foreign
relations was sometimes subject to the vagaries of the independent states.
The restrictions contained in the Articles of Confederation were meant to protect what little power the national government truly possessed from state encroachment. These restrictions did not, however, prove effective with the
passage of time. See infra note 36.
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provided that Congress alone (like the crown) was to be the "last
resort on appeal in all disputes and differences... between two or
more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause
whatever ... -35
Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed on the states by the
congressional consent requirement, history under the Articles of
Confederation is replete with examples of the states acting with
little respect for the prerogatives or authority of the national government. 36 Consequently, in forging a new constitution, the Fram-

35. Articles of Confederation, art. IV (U.S. 1781). Article IV proceeded to
create an elaborate procedural mechanism by which the "legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another"
would petition Congress for a hearing. Id. Notice would then be provided to
the other state(s) involved in the controversy setting a day for the parties to
appear. Id. The parties would then, by joint consent, appoint commissioners
or judges to determine the matter sitting as a court of last resort. Id. If the
parties could not agree, Congress would name three persons from each state
and the parties would then alternatively strike names from the list until thirteen names were reached. Id. Congress would then, by drawing lots, appoint
a commission from the list of not less than seven persons or more than nine
persons to determine the matter. Id. That determination was final. Id. It is
interesting to note the remarkable similarities between the process of resolving colonial disputes and the resolution of state disputes under the Articles of
Confederation. In large part, the process conceived in the Articles of Confederation closely mirrored the process used by the crown during the colonial
era. Colonial disputes were either (1) negotiated then submitted to the crown
for approval (a process similar to the compact method), or (2) appealed directly to the crown through the Privy Council (a process similar to submitting
state disputes directly to Congress). See generally Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 692-93.
36. The difficulty with governing under the Articles of Confederation was
as much attitudinal as practical. For example, in FederalistNo. 44, James
Madison, in addressing the people of New York on the new Constitution, observed:
In the first place, as these [state] Constitutions invest the State
Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by
the existing articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in
the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in
the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress
would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their
predecessors.
In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the States do
not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the
Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former,
would in such States have brought into question, every power contained in the proposed Constitution.
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ers were very cognizant of the deficiencies of the Articles and the
threat that unchecked state allegiances posed to the continued
harmony of the union. 37 The union could not be preserved absent
some form of institutional control over joint state action because
the federal structure of two concurrent sovereigns could encourage
some states to act in concert for the benefit of some regions of the
country and to the detriment of other regions or the national government.38 If the Constitution represents anything from a philosophical standpoint, it is the evolution away from a pure federation
of sovereign states to a federal union of states, each maintaining
some dignity as a sovereign entity while simultaneously ceding a

THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison); see also Brutus IX, The Dangers of
a Standing Army, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, at 45, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION 45 (The Library of America 1993) ("It is acknowledged by
this writer, that the powers of Congress, under the present confederation,
amount to little more than that of recommending."); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) ("[A] central concern of the Framers [was that] ...
the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among.., the States under the Articles
When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity
that war had exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began. "... each State would legislate according
to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a
political or commercial view." This came "to threaten at once the
peace and safety of the Union."
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (quoting STORY,
THE CONSTITUTION, §§ 259, 260).
37. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 309
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Compact Clause of the
Constitution was intended to be more restrictive on joint state action than
the restrictions contained in the Articles of Confederation). The rationale offered in Brennan's concurring opinion provides further insight into his majority opinion in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981), discussed infra pp. 10105. Brennan consistently adhered to the notion that the constitutional requirement of congressional consent was to be read broadly, particularly given
the restrictive nature of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. However,
once consent was obtained, the effect was to immediately convert an interstate compact into federal law fully enforceable through the federal courts.
Feeney, 495 U.S. at 314-15, 318-19.
38. This is sometimes referred to as the "collective action problem,"
where two or more states maximize their own interests through collective
and cooperative efforts. See Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism
and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 842, 844-47 (1989).
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portion of their sovereignty to the national government. 39 Consequently, the Framers of the Constitution not only reserved to the
federal government certain exclusive powers, but also continued
the congressional consent requirement as a key ingredient of, and
restriction upon, interstate agreements. 40 'The basic purpose of
39. This evolutionary thinking is evidenced by many of the early decisions of the Supreme Court. For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), a seminal case on state versus federal authority, Chief
Justice Marshall observed:
In discussing this question, [whether the federal government
usurped state power] the counsel for the state of Maryland have
deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not as emanating from the people,
but as the act of sovereign and independent states. The powers of the
general government, it has been said, are delegated by the states,
who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion. It would be
difficult to sustain this proposition. The convention which framed
the constitution was indeed elected by the state legislatures. But the
instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal,
without obligation, or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then
existing congress of the United States, with a request that it might
"be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state by
the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for
their assent and ratification."...
No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they
act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not, on
that account, cease to measures of the people themselves, or become
the measures of state governments.
Id. at 402-03; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1824);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816). Each of these cases contains a discussion on state versus federal authority. However, it is important to note
that each of these cases involved an explicitly enumerated power of the federal government. The fact that the newly created Constitution vested the federal court with sovereignty does not necessarily mean that the states were
completely dispossessed of their sovereignty with regard to certain matters.
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that states continue to possess
fundamental aspects of sovereignty. See supra text accompanying note 2; discussion infra p. 88; see also Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 (2002) (examining the Supreme Court's recent state sovereignty rulings).
40. In FederalistNo. 43, James Madison observed:
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed
of republican members, the superintending government ought
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the constitutional requirement of Congressional consent is to
make certain that no such agreements [those affecting the balance
of power in the federal structure] can stand against the will of
Congress."41 The Compact Clause in Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution reflects the Framers' paradoxical views that at once
acknowledged the need for interstate cooperation (and by extension the limited sovereignty of each state) while simultaneously
restricting that very cooperation out of fear that internecine political alliances would evolve and destroy the union.
The Constitution permits states to enter into compacts, in
most cases subject to congressional consent. 42 Unlike the Articles
of Confederation, the Constitution relieves Congress of the obligation to settle state disputes, giving that responsibility to the Suclearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic
or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a
union may be, the greater interest have the members in political institutions of each other; and the great right to insist that the forms
of government under which the compact was entered into should be
substantiallymaintained .... If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will
be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say
what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular
States, by ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and
influence of foreign powers?
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 290-91 (James Madison) (Heritage Press, 1945)
(second emphasis added). Although Madison made this observation in commenting on the requirement that the states guarantee their citizens a republican form of government, it provides insight into his view of the states and
dangers posed by unrestrained state action.
41. FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE
OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS

22 (Council of State Governments 1976).

42. Some argue that "the framers... astutely created a mechanism of
legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines and yet may
not call for, nor be capable of, national treatment." Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 695. However, the Compact Clause of the Constitution has a
more dubious interpretation, as some have observed. Article I, Section 10 of
the Constitution contains a long list of prohibitions on the states, including a
prohibition against joint state action without the consent of Congress. The
Compact Clause is actually worded in the negative, not the affirmative.
Rather than creating a legal mechanism to promote joint state action subject
to national control, the Framers created a legal mechanism to restrict state
action only to those areas approved by Congress. The underlying supposition
is that joint state action is not preferred except in the most extraordinary of
circumstances. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299,
309 (1990), supra note 37. As to the limitations on the congressional consent
requirement, see infra Part I.C.2.
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preme Court.43 The development of a strong national judiciary is
believed to be a major factor restraining state power and, in some
circumstances, compelling the use of interstate compacts as a
means of resolving state disputes and promoting state coopera4 As one scholar has noted:
tion.A
The mere fact of the existence of the [Supreme] Court,
with its mighty jurisdiction, has not only encouraged a
habit on the part of the States of resorting to it for a decision of their controversies, but it has also encouraged an
equally important habit of settling such controversies out
of the Court, by means of compacts entered into between
States.4

43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("In all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.").
44. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 314 (1904).
The original draft of the Constitution reported to the convention
gave to the Senate jurisdiction of all disputes and controversies "between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory," and to
the Supreme Court jurisdiction of "controversies between two or
more States, except such as shall regard territory or jurisdiction." A
claim for money due being a controversy of a justiciable nature, and
one of the most common controversies, would seem to naturally fall
within the scope of the jurisdiction thus intended to be conferred
upon the Supreme Court. In the subsequent revision by the convention the power given to the Senate in respect to controversies between the States was stricken out as well as the limitation upon the
jurisdiction of this court, leaving to it in the language now found in
the Constitution jurisdiction without any limitation of "controversies
between two or more States."
Id.
45. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 69
(Princeton University Press 1924). While a powerful national judiciary has
certainly affected interstate compacts, federal courts have not always been
willing to jump into conflicts between states concerning compacts. See, e.g.,
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518-20 (1893) (holding that the Compact
Clause does not make the Supreme Court the final arbiter with respect to the
interpretation of interstate compacts); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 101-06, 109-10 (1938) (holding that the
meaning of an interstate compact does not present a federal question); see
also Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427
(1940). But see Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 176 (1930).
The fact that the solution of these questions may involve the determination of the effect of the local legislation of either State, as well
as of acts of Congress, which are said to authorize the contract, in no
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B. Compacts, Federalismand State Sovereignty
In theory, the Constitution divides governing authority between two coexisting sovereign entities. As Felix Frankfurter once
observed, "The Constitution is naturally acclaimed as the creative
achievement of statesmen bent on maintaining the co-operation of
the States and on forming 'a more perfect Union."46 This "union of
states" philosophically underlies the federal charter of government
in the United States; that is, the lawmaking, law enforcement and
the law interpreting functions are vested not only in three separate and independent branches of government, but also between
two sets of coterminous sovereign authorities-the states and the
federal government. 47 Viewed from this perspective, the Constituway affects the duty of this Court to act as the final, constitutional
arbiter in deciding the questions properly presented.
Id.; see also Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1958).
The construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress under Art.
I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution presents a federal question. Moreover, the meaning of a compact is a question on which this Court has
the final say. The rule is no different when the contention is that a
State has, by compact, waived its immunity from suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
This Court, however, finds that Congress, in granting the necessary consent to the Compact, imposed suability in the federal courts
upon the States as a condition to its consent. No doubt Congress
could have insisted upon a provision waiving immunity from suit in
the federal courts as the price of obtaining its consent to the Compact.
Id. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 685. The authors went on to
note that "[iun the creation lurked the seeds of inevitable contest between the
new Union and its constituent members." Id.
47. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769
(2002).
While some might complain that our system of dual sovereignty
is not a model of administrative convenience, that is not its purpose.... By guarding against encroachments by the Federal Government on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty, such as
sovereign immunity, we strive to maintain the balance of power embodied in our Constitution and thus to "reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front."
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)); see also Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("The 'constitutionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal
Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our
fundamental liberties."' (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
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tion is itself perhaps the ultimate example of the use and power of
an interstate compact.48
Subject to limited constitutional constraints, states retain
substantial (some would even argue exclusive) authority to regulate activities that take place within their borders. 49 As the Supreme Court noted in Alden v. Maine:
The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the States in two ways.
469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting))); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 592 n.1 (2001).
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty
that underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force
where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the
question is not whether Congress intended to pre-empt state regulation, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous evidence,
infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which clearly is mandated
by Congress' language.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 533 (1992)).
48. The Constitution arguably has many of the elements of an interstate
compact and has sometimes been referred to as a compact. See Padelford, Fay
& Co. v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 520 (1854) ("The Constitution, it is true, is a
compact.... The States are the parties to it."), overruled by Raifv. State, 136
S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964). It was a creature of then sovereign states negotiated by representatives of the original thirteen states and ratified by
them. Its ratification provision stated that "nine States, shall be sufficient for
the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
same.' U.S. CONST. art. VII. The counter argument to this interpretation is
that the people of sovereign states-not the states in their sovereign capacity-adopted the new Constitution and the states merely ratified their act.
Within this interpretation is the implication that the states were never truly
sovereign entities, but always acted in a subservient role to the national government. See supra note 39. But cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15
(1999) (discussing the ways that the Constitution preserves the sovereign
status of the States).
49. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court has decided several
noteworthy cases addressing the issue of where state authority ends and federal authority begins. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19
(1997). Several of these cases have resulted from actions by Congress to regulate state conduct through its commerce clause power. Although these cases
directly questioned whether Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority, the underlying debate on states' rights is as old as the Constitution. Id.
("Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal
Government, they retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.'"(quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))).
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First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and
essential attributes inhering in that status. The states
"form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to
the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."
Second, even as to matters within the competence of
the National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding generation's rejection of "the concept
of a central government that would act upon the States"
in favor of "a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the

people ....

"50

Thus, states continue to possess many of the characteristics of
sovereign entities as to matters within their borders and, to some
extent, as to matters between them under interstate compacts.5 1
50. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (citation omitted).
51. See, e.g., id. at 713-14 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996)).
Although the Constitution establishes a National Government
with broad, often plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence, the founding document "specifically recognizes the
States as sovereign entities.". . . Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the
Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of
the national power.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W~e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system
with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty . . . ." (citations omitted)).
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also has recognized this fundamental principle.
In Tafflin v. Levitt, "[w]e beg[a]n with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of
the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause."
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
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This fact seems lost to many in an age where states are frequently
viewed as mere political subdivisions of the national govern52
ment.
American federalism rests on the shared exercise of government authority by two sovereign bodies and, as such, solutions to
problems have generally "been conceived in terms of exclusive duality."5 3 Those matters of national concern, such as interstate
commerce, foreign affairs and national defense, rest within the exclusive authority of the federal government, while the states continue to exercise a significant portion of the nation's general police
power as entities whose sovereignty is coterminous with that of
the federal government. Even today, some argue that the "Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local."M
However, in recent years, complex regional or national problems have shown little respect for the dual lines of federalism and
the geographical boundaries of states. The practicalities of governing a large, multifaceted, federally designed nation frequently blur
distinctions between what is distinctly "national" in scope and
what is distinctly 'local" in scope. 55 The emergence of broad public
policy issues that ignore state boundaries and the principles of
federalism have presented new governing challenges to both state
and federal authorities. 56 The fundamental question presented by
52. See generally Gey, supra note 39.
53. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 688.
54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding the
remedy for a civil rights violation under the Violence Against Women Act, 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), unconstitutional).
55. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921). There,
the court held:
We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of
this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the
large and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay
is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by
conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of
the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court
however constituted.

Id.
56. For example, according to 2000 Census figures, over thirty of the
largest metropolitan areas in the United States extend across state lines.
These include the following Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) with their national ranking: New York - Northern New Jersey - Long Island (NY, NJ, CT, PA
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these issues is: How does a nation, founded on federalism, which
is experiencing increasing social, political and economic integration, continue to respect the principle of dual sovereignty while
contemporaneously confronting supra-state, sub-federal problems?
This is precisely where interstate compacts, such as the
ICAOS, provide an effective solution. Compacts fit comfortably
into the federal scheme because they enable the states-in their
sovereign capacity-to act jointly and generally outside the confines of the federal legislative or regulatory process while concomitantly respecting the view of Congress on the appropriateness of
joint action.5 7 Equally important, compacts effectively preempt
federal interference into matters that are traditionally within the
58
purview of the states but have regional or national implications.
Unlike federal actions that generally impose unilateral, rigid
CMSA), ranking 1; Chicago - Gary - Kenosha (IL, IN, WI CMSA), ranking
3; Washington - Baltimore (DC, MD, VA, WV CMSA), ranking 4; Philadelphia - Wilmington - Atlantic City (PA, NJ, DE, MD CMSA), ranking 6; Boston - Worcester - Lawrence (MA, NH, ME, CT CMSA), ranking 7; St. Louis
(MO, IL MSA), ranking 18; Portland - Salem (OR, WA CMSA), ranking 23;
Cincinnati - Hamilton (OH, KY, IN CMSA), ranking 24; Kansas City (MO,
KS MSA), ranking 26; Norfolk - Virginia Beach - Newport News (VA, NC
MSA), ranking 31; Las Vegas (NV, AZ MSA), ranking 32. These eleven areas
contain almost 62,000,000 people, or approximately 25% of the U.S. population. Census 2000 PHC-T-3. Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990
and 2000, tbl. 3: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Population: 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
57. As Garland C. Routt observed, "The Constitution itself, while it apparently did not contemplate the development of administrative relationships
between the state and the central government, departed from federal theory
in giving recognition under certain conditions, to agreements and joint action
by the states." Garland C. Routt, Interstate Compacts and Administrative Cooperation, 207 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 93 (1940).
58. One example of a federal attempt to preempt state control over the
interstate movement of adult offenders is "Aimee's Law." 42 U.S.C. § 13713
(2002). Under this act, the U.S. Attorney General is required to transfer federal law enforcement assistance funds, due a state that convicted a person of
certain offenses, to the state that convicted a person of a subsequent offense.
Id. § 13713(c)(1). Congress, using its power of the purse and the power of federal grant programs, sought to compel states to be more conscientious about
the interstate movement of individuals convicted of murder, rape or child molestation. Most recently, discussions have been initiated to revise the Driver
License Compact. See, e.g., Driver License Compact, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2,
§ 8101 (2001). One reason for this renewed scrutiny is to prevent the federal
government from assuming control over this matter as a means of creating a
national identity card to promote national security in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
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mandates, compacts afford states the opportunity to develop dynamic, self-regulatory systems, over which the member states can
maintain control through a coordinated legislative and administrative process. The very nature of an interstate compact makes it
an "ideal tool to meet the demand for cooperative state action to
develop and enforce stringent standards" upon the member
states. 59 Compacts also enable the states to develop adaptive
structures that can evolve to meet new and increased challenges
that naturally arise over time. 60 In short, through the compact device, states acting jointly can not only control the solution to a
problem but can also shape the future response as the problem
changes.
C. The DualNature of Compacts
To understand the potential reach of compacts like the ICAOS
and those that may be modeled after it, one must appreciate the
legal status of interstate compacts within the constitutional
framework. Interstate compacts, particularly those receiving congressional consent, have what may be described as a dual or binary nature. Compacts are state laws adopted by state
legislatures that bind sister states to fully enforceable contracts.
Thus, compacts are concurrently statutory (within a member
state) and contractual (between the member states). However,
compacts are also creatures of state governments that, under particular circumstances, function as the "law of the United States,"
enforceable not only as contracts between member states, but also
against individual member states under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution. It is this dual or binary nature of compacts-at
once both statutory and contractual, state and federal-that gives
61
them a unique legal standing.

59. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, STATE OFFICIALS GUIDE: INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION 22 (July 2002).

60. The Supreme Court has recognized the flexibility of compacts to meet
both immediate and future concerns. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383,
392 (1943).
61. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) ("[A] compact
when approved by Congress becomes a law of the United States." (citing
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983))).
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1. State Laws that are Binding Contracts
Interstate compacts are initiated by the adoption of enabling
statutes by the legislatures of the member states. It is the act of
adoption of such statutes that creates contractual obligations between the states. There is an offer (a proposal to enact, virtually
verbatim, statutes by each member state), an acceptance (enactment of the statutes by the member states), and consideration (the
settlement of a dispute, creation of an association or some mechanism to address an issue of mutual interest).62 Many modem com63
pacts also contain provisions for withdrawal or termination.
While compacts are most often given force by state legislatures
adopting virtually identical statutes, compacts can also be activated by legislative acts authorizing entry into force by administrative action. 64

62. As Zimmermann and Wendell observed, "The principle of consideration is probably applicable to compacts, but it has far less practical meaning
than in the field of private contracts." ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note
41, at 9.
63. See, e.g., ICAOS, art. XII, cl. 1, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult
%20Compact%20Language.pdf ("Once effective, the Compact shall continue
in force and remain binding upon each and every Compacting State; provided, that a Compacting State may withdrawal from the Compact ("Withdrawing State") by enacting a statute specifically repealing the statute which
enacted the Compact into law."). The provision goes on to describe the procedure by which a state actually withdraws including notice requirements, the
effective date of withdrawal, and a state's post-withdrawal responsibilities
regarding assessments, liabilities, and obligations. Id. cl. 2-6; see also Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 550.11, art.
XII, § A (West 1948).
64. See, e.g., Nonresident Violator Compact of 1977, art. VII, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-54-101 (1994) (providing specifically that the compact may be entered into force "by a resolution of ratification, executed by authorized officials of the applying jurisdiction."). As to entry into force by administrative
act, the language of the compact must specifically provide such a mechanism.
If a state uses an administrative act without specific compact authorization,
the compact may be null and void as to that state. See, e.g., Driver License
Compact, art. VIII, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8101 (2001) (providing specifically that the compact "enter[s] into force and becomes effective as to any
state when it has enacted the [Compact] into law."). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Sullivan v. DOT, 708 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1998), that the
Compact was not in effect in that state because the legislature enacted a
statute empowering the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to enter into the Compact rather than enact the specific language of the Compact
as required. Id. at 485. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that since
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It is important to appreciate that compacts are not mere intergovernmental agreements or informal administrative alliances.
Although passed by state legislatures in essentially the same
form, compacts are not "uniform laws" as that term is commonly
understood. 65 Compacts like the ICAOS are binding legal contracts
with their terms and conditions controlling-even trumping-the
actions and conduct of the member states as to the subject matter
of the compacts.66 The fact that compacts are creations and creathe Compact was a contract, Pennsylvania law required the court to interpret
the Compact within the four-corners of the instrument. Id. at 484.
65. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), ALA. CODE § 7-2-101
(1998); Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-23.1101 (2002); Uniform Act on Close Pursuit, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 976.04 (West
1998); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, ALA. CODE § 8-9a-1 (2002); Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-30
(West 1994); Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-140 (2002).
Uniform Acts are promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in an effort to study and review the laws of the states
to determine which areas should be uniform between the states. Legislatures
are urged to adopt Uniform Acts exactly as written to promote such uniformity. Model Acts are designed to serve as guideline legislation, which states
can borrow from, or adapt, to suit their individual needs and conditions. Although legislatures are urged to adopt uniform acts as written, they are not
required to do so and may make changes to fit individual state needs. Uniform acts do not constitute a contract between the states, even if adopted by
all states in the same form, and thus, unlike contracts, are not binding upon
or enforceable against the states. While uniform acts unify state laws as to
those states adopting them, compacts can provide enforcement tools not only
as to the populous but also as to the states themselves. Compacts are, therefore, a more powerful, albeit complex, tool for promoting uniform state behavior as to the subject matter of the compact. A state's failure to adopt a
uniform law exactly as proposed has no impact on the state's relation to other
similarly situated states as sovereigns within a constituent union. A state's
decision to unilaterally modify a uniform law after adoption does not constitute any type of violation for which the state is accountable at law.
66. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519 (1906) ("The compact,
by the sanction of Congress, had become a law of the Union. A state law
which violated it was unconstitutional.").
By this surrender of the power, which before the adoption of the constitution was vested in every state, of settling these contested
boundaries, as in the plenitude of their sovereignty they might; they
could settle them neither by war, or in peace, by treaty, compact or
agreement, without the permission of the new legislative power
which the states brought into existence by their respective and several grants in conventions of the people. If Congress consented, then
the states were in this respect restored to their original inherent
sovereignty; such consent being the sole limitation imposed by the
constitution, when given, left the states as they were before,...
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tures of individual state legislatures in no way alters their status
as contracts with enforceable obligations between member states.
By entering into a compact, the member states contractually
agree on certain principles and rules. Depending on the terms of
the compact, a state may effectively cede a portion of its individual
sovereignty over the subject of the agreement, as is the case with
the ICAOS.67 Once entered, the terms of the compact, as well as

whereby their compacts became of binding force, and finally settled
the boundary between them; operating with the same effect as a
treaty between sovereign powers.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 725 (1838); see also Nebraska v.
Cent. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 207 F.3d 1021, 1026
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the state of Nebraska did not have a unilateral
right to exercise a veto when such an act was not authorized by the compact).
Upon entering into an interstate compact, a state effectively surrenders a portion of its sovereignty; the compact governs the relations of
the parties with respect to the subject matter of the agreement and
is superior to both prior and subsequent law. Further, when enacted,
a compact constitutes not only law, but a contract which may not be
amended, modified, or otherwise altered without the consent of all
parties. It, therefore, appears settled that one party may not enact
legislation which would impose burdens upon the compact absent
the concurrence of the other signatories.
C.T. Hellmuth & Assoc. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transp. Auth., 414 F. Supp.
408, 409 (D. Md. 1976).
67. ICAOS, art. XIV, §§ A, B, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20
Compact%20Language.pdf. These two sections of the new Compact provide,
in part:
Section A. Other Laws.
All Compacting States' laws conflicting with this Compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.
Section B. Binding Effect of the Compact.
All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all Rules
and By-laws promulgated by the Interstate Commission, are binding
upon the Compacting States. All agreements between the Interstate
Commission and the Compacting States are binding in accordance
with their terms.
Id.; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11180 (West Supp. 2003). The drafters of the
Compact did provide an escape clause in article XIV as to the binding effect of
the Compact and its rules. To the extent that a provision of the Compact exceeds constitutional limitations imposed on the legislature of any compacting
state, the "duties, powers or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction shall remain in the Compacting State."
ICAOS, art. XIV, § B. However, it should be noted that only a state constitutional limitation can trigger the escape clause.
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any rules and regulations authorized by the compact, supersede
substantive state laws that may be in conflict, including state constitutional provisions, unless a specific exemption applies. 68 Moreover, member states must not take unilateral actions, such as the
adoption of conflicting legislation or the issuance of executive orders or court rules that violate the terms of a compact. 69 The legal
standing of compacts as contracts and instruments of national law
applicable to the member states annuls any state action in conflict
with its terms and conditions. Therefore, once adopted, the only
means available to change the substance of a compact (and the obligations it imposes on a member state) are through withdrawal
and renegotiation of its terms, or through an amendment adopted
by all member states in essentially the same form. The contractual nature of the compact controls over any unilateral action by a
state; no state being allowed to adopt any laws "impairing the obligation of contracts," 70 including a contract adopted by state legis-

68. Under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, the
federal questions are the execution, validity and meaning of federally approved state compacts. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. A compact controls
over a state's application of its own law through the Supremacy Clause. See
id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also supra discussion at notes 66, 67; Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S.
163, 176 (1930).
It has frequently been held that when a question is suitably raised
whether the law of a State has impaired the obligation of a contract,
in violation of the constitutional provision, this Court must determine for itself whether a contract exists, what are its obligations,
and whether they have been impaired by the legislation of the State.
While this Court always examines with appropriate respect the decisions of state courts bearing upon such questions, such decisions do
not detract from the responsibility of this Court in reaching its own
conclusions as to the contract, its obligations and impairment, for
otherwise the constitutional guaranty could not properly be enforced.
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 29 (1951) (citing Larson v.
South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 433 (1929)).
69. See Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (holding that reciprocal statutes passed by two states did
not constitute a compact when the states retained authority to unilaterally
modify or repeal the statutes, and when the effect of the statutes was not
conditioned upon the action of another state).
70. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, provides, in part, "No state shall...
pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts . ..."
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latures pursuant to the Compact Clause. 71 This analysis is not
meant to suggest that states are simply "parties" to an ordinary,
run-of-the-mill contract. The mere fact that the Supreme Court
may exercise its very limited original jurisdiction in compact disputes is one indication of the importance the Framers attached to
the status of the states as sovereign members joined in a constituent union. This special status of the states can present unique
"contractual" issues, particularly when enforcing the terms of a
compact. For example, in South Dakota v. North Carolina,the Supreme Court recognized the propriety of money judgments against
states as part of an original action, but acknowledged that forcing
a state legislature to actually pay another state can present a
unique problem. 72 However, the Supreme Court also noted in
Texas v. New Mexico:
71. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 33 (1951) (Reed,
J., concurring); see also Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 101 Colo. 73 (1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Presumably the "trumping"
nature of compacts would extend not only to unilateral action by the state
legislatures but also actions by executive agencies and the courts. For example, court rules that might conflict with a provision in an interstate compact
would most likely be void. Likewise, an executive order whose terms conflict
with the terms and conditions of an interstate compact would also most likely
be void. Neither could a county probation department act outside the parameters of the ICAOS in discharging its supervisory responsibilities over
persons transferred into the state or in sending its probationers out of state.
By entering into a compact, a state legislature binds "the state," including all
of its governmental branches, departments, and political subdivisions.
72. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 320-21 (1904); see also
Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (1987) ("The Court has recognized
the propriety of money judgments against a State in an original action, and
specifically in a case involving a compact. In proper original actions, the
Eleventh Amendment is no barrier, for by its terms, it applies only to suits by
citizens against a State.") (citations omitted); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). As to the limitations on actions to recover damages
from states, see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).
Colorado contends, however, that the Eleventh Amendment precludes any such recovery based on losses sustained by individual water users in Kansas. It is firmly established, and undisputed in this
litigation, that the text of the Eleventh Amendment would bar a direct action against Colorado by citizens of Kansas. Moreover, we
have several times held that a State may not invoke our original jurisdiction when it is merely acting as an agent or trustee for one or
more of its citizens.
Id.; see also New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88-89 (1883) (stating
that the Court will not assume jurisdiction over an action to recover payment
on defaulted bonds that had been formally assigned to the state but remained
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That there may be difficulties in enforcing judgments
against States counsels caution, but does not undermine
our authority to enter judgments against defendant
States in cases over which the Court has undoubted jurisdiction, authority that is attested to by the fact that
almost invariably the "States against which judgments
were rendered, conformably to their duty under the Constitution, voluntarily respected and gave effect to the
73
same."
Thus, notwithstanding the special status of states and the
challenges presented with enforcing compacts, compacts fundamentally constitute enforceable obligations between the states just
as if the states were acting as private parties to a legally binding
contract.
2. State Creationswith NationalEffect
An unvarnished reading of the Compact Clause could lead one
to conclude that any agreement between two or more states requires congressional consent.7 4 However, compacts can generally
beneficially owned by private individuals; the Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction where the state is only a nominal actor in the proceeding); North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1923) (recognizing that a state
could obtain an injunction against the improper operation of another state's
drainage ditches, but the Eleventh Amendment barred damages based on injuries to individual farmers, where the damages claim was financed by contributions from the farmers and the state had committed to dividing any
recovery among the farmers in proportion to the amount of their loss); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938) (holding that to invoke original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a "[s]tate must show a direct
interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals
who are the real parties in interest").
73. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130, 131; see also id. at 128 ("By
ratifying the Constitution, the States gave this Court complete judicial power
to adjudicate disputes among them,... and this power includes the capacity
to provide one State a remedy for the breach of another.") (citation omitted).
74. In giving consent, Congress may also impose certain limitations on
compacts both in duration and substance. For example, 16 U.S.C.A. § 544(d),
affecting the management of Columbia River Gorge, provides "[miandatory
language... of this title respecting the powers and responsibilities of the
Commission shall be interpreted as conditions precedent to congressional
consent to the interstate compact described in section 544c of this title." 16
U.S.C.A. § 544o(d) (West 2002); see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 7256, § 7256(1)-(7)
(West Supp. 2002) ("Congress hereby consents to the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact... subject to" (a) the Secretary of Agriculture finding a com-
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be divided into two simple camps: those that require congressional
consent and those that do not. The Supreme Court has long held
that not all interstate agreements constitute formal compacts requiring Article I, Section 10 consent.7 5 In Virginia v. Tennessee,
the Court concluded that the Compact Clause requires congressional consent only with respect to those agreements that intrude
on the power of the federal government or alter the political balance between the states and the national government.7 6 For example, in 1976, the Supreme Court held that congressional
consent was not needed to legitimize an agreement between
Maine and New Hampshire that ended a dispute over a lateral
maritime boundary.7 7 The Court concluded that because the
agreement did not affect the balance of power between the states
and federal government or threaten the prerogatives of the national government as to the issue in dispute, congressional consent was not required.78 Thus, states may enter enforceable
agreements between themselves without the consent of Congress
so long as those agreements do not infringe on federal interests or
shift the balance of power within the federal structure of the government.7 9 Even when states have customarily sought congres-

pelling public interest to permit implementation of the compact, (b) limiting
price setting authority of the Commission, and (c) expiring on September 30,
2001).
75. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-60,
463-65, 468-69 (1978).
76. 148 U.S. 503, 521-22 (1893). The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee not only affirmed the notion that only those compacts affecting the "political balance" of the federal system need consent, but the Court also stated
that consent can be implied after the fact. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that
Congress consented to the Virginia-Tennessee boundary compact by setting
up judicial districts and taking a number of other actions acknowledging the
boundary determined by the compact. Id.
77. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976).
78. Id.; see also id. at 369-70; U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 472-73 (noting
that the multistate tax compact did not require congressional consent because the commission can do nothing more than the states are empowered to
do themselves and thus the compact does not encroach on the power of the
federal government).
79. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981), in which the Supreme
Court held:
Where an agreement is not "directed to the formulation of any combination tending to increase the political power of the States, which
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
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sional consent for reasons of caution and convenience, the mere
act of consent is not automatically dispositive of whether it was
required.8 0 However, once congressional consent is deemed applicable and appropriately given, the nature of a compact changes
radically. It no longer constitutes an agreement between states.

United States," it does not fall within the scope of the Clause and
will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.
Id. at 433. Thus, for example, congressional consent was not needed with reference to the Southern Regional Education Compact because it dealt with an
area-education-that is normally a function of the States. The Compact did
not infringe on any federal interest but only affected established state interests. 94 CONG. REC. 5531, 5622 (daily ed. May 11, 1948); see also McComb v.
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children has not received
Congressional consent. Rather than altering the balance of power
between the states and the federal government, this Compact focuses wholly on adoption and foster care of children - areas of jurisdiction historically retained by the states. Congressional consent,
therefore, was not necessary for the Compact's legitimacy.... Because Congressional consent was neither given nor required, the
Compact does not express federal law. Consequently, this Compact
must be construed as state law.
Id. at 479.
80. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 470-71 ("The mere form of the interstate agreement cannot be dispositive .... The relevant inquiry must be one
of impact on our federal structure."). But see the discussion of Cuyler infra
pp. 101-02. The Court majority in Cuyler appears to have taken a more liberal view of when congressional consent is required. Id. While the decision in
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. at 470-71, reaffirmed
the long held principle that consent is required where a compact changes the
balance of the federal structure, the Court in Cuyler determined that congressional consent nationalizes a compact where the subject of the compact is
an "appropriate subject for congressional legislation." 449 U.S. at 440. Thus,
after Cuyler, the controlling principle in the consent requirement appears to
be not whether the agreement changes the balance of power in the federal
structure, but whether the subject matter of the agreement would be appropriate to some form of national legislation. One could argue that, in effect, the
Court liberalized the constitutional consent standard from one that focuses
on whether the agreement alters the balance of power in the federal structure
to one focusing on whether the agreement infringes on the prerogatives of
Congress to address issues through national legislation. This is a more liberal
standard with significant implications. In an era of national government, little, arguably, escapes the purview of Congress's national legislative authority. Whether this view will continue to prevail in the aftermath of several
recent Court decisions affirming state sovereignty remains to be seen.
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Rather, compacts that receive congressional consent become the
81
"law of the United States" under the Law-of-the-Union doctrine.
Congress can give consent in one of two ways: it may explicitly authorize the states to create a compact, or it can take actions
82
subsequent to the adoption of a compact that imply consent.
Whether explicit or implied, congressional consent is important for
its effect on the legal standing of a compact, not only as a contract
between member states, but more importantly, as an instrument
of national law.8 3 The Supreme Court recognized in Cuyler v. Adams that consent "transforms the States' agreement into federal
81. Compacts are contracts within the meaning and limitations of the
Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution. See Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A Compact is, after all, a contract. Ordinarily, in the interpretation of a
contract, the meaning the parties attribute to the words governs the obligations assumed in the agreement."); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A compact is a contract. It represents a bargained-for exchange between its signatories and 'remains a legal document that must be construed and applied in accordance
with its terms."' (citation omitted)); cf. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124,
128 (1987) ("[A compact] remains a legal document that must be construed
and applied in accordance with its terms.").
82. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1892). Congress's consent to an interstate compact is not an entitlement. See, e.g., College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686
(1999) ("Under the Compact Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 3, States cannot form an interstate compact without first obtaining the express consent of
Congress; the granting of such consent is a gratuity.").
83. Such was not always the Supreme Court's interpretation of the congressional consent requirement. For example, in People v. Central Railroad,
79 U.S. 455, 456 (1870), the Supreme Court suggested that interstate compacts could not be considered federal law. However, this position was largely
abandoned by the Court in Delaware River Commission v. Colburn, 310 U.S.
419, 427 (1940), where the Supreme Court held:
In People v. Central Railroad,jurisdiction of this Court to review
a judgment of a state court construing a compact between states was
denied on the ground that the Compact was not a statute of the
United States and that the construction of the Act of Congress giving
consent was in no way drawn in question, nor was any right set up
under it. This decision has long been doubted, and we now conclude
that the construction of such a compact sanctioned by Congress by
virtue of Article I, § 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution, involves a federal "title, right, privilege or immunity" which when "specially set up
and claimed" in a state court may be reviewed here on certiorari ....
Id. (citations omitted). This holding reaffirmed the Law-of-the-Union doctrine
and the underlying principle that congressional consent can transform interstate compacts into federal law. Id.
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law under the Compact Clause." 4 Although the Supreme Court
has qualified its consent analysis, holding that it applies "Where
the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for
congressional legislation,"5 cases subsequent to Cuyler suggest
that the Court assigns great significance to the mere existence of
congressional consent, perhaps more than is appropriate given the
subject matter of the compact.8 6 Therefore, the general principle is
that once Congress gives consent, the compact is presumptively
transformed into the "law of the United States" absent some com87
pelling evidence that consent was not required.
84. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440; see also Waterfront Comm'n v. ElizabethNewark Shipping, 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Although the Compact is
a creature of state legislatures, it is federalized by virtue of congressional approval pursuant to the Compact Clause. .. ."). But see Cuyler, 449 U.S. at
450 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In a remarkable feat of judicial alchemy the
Court today transforms a state law into federal law.").
85. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440.
86. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
In reaching its conclusion, the Court attaches undue significance
to the requirement that Congress consent to interstate compacts.
Admittedly, the consent requirement performs an important function
in our federal scheme .... But the consent clause neither transforms
the nature of state power nor makes Congress a full-fledged participant in the underlying agreement; it requires only that Congress
"check any infringement of the rights of the national government."
Id. at 56-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). But cf Malone v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 622 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (E.D. Va. 1985)
("In Cuyler v. Adams, the Supreme Court held that the test for whether an
interstate compact becomes federal law is whether it 'is a congressionally
sanctioned interstate compact within Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution.'" (citation omitted)).
87. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440; see also Old Town Trolley Tours v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 129 F.3d 201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Congressional consent. . . 'transforms an interstate compact ... into a law of the
United States.'" (quoting Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438)); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.
339, 347 (1994). But cf Hess, 513 U.S. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("But
the consent clause neither transforms the nature of state power nor makes
Congress a full-fledged participant in the underlying agreement; it requires
only that Congress 'check any infringement of the rights of the national government.'" (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1403 (T. Cooley ed., 1873))).
In light of our recent decisions, however, it cannot seriously be contended that the Detainer Agreement constitutes an "agreement or
compact" as those terms have come to be understood in the Compact
Clause.... Certainly nothing about the Detainer Agreement threatens the just supremacy of the United States or enhances state power
to the detriment of federal sovereignty.... Although never main-
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One consequence of the "transformational" rationale articulated by the Court in Cuyler is that congressional consent places
the interpretation and enforcement of interstate compacts
squarely within the purview of the federal judiciary.8 8 "[A] congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact
Clause is a federal law subject to federal construction."8 9 This is
taining that congressional consent was required by the Compact
Clause for the Detainer Agreement-a conclusion foreclosed by our
decisions-the Court nonetheless views its inquiry as "whether the
Detainer Agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution" and concludes in this
case that 'the consent of Congress transforms the State's agreement
into federal law under the Compact Clause." Whether a particular
state enactment is 'within' or 'under' the Compact Clause, however,
depends on whether it requires the consent of Congress the Clause
speaks of nothing else. Whatever effect the Compact Clause may
have on those laws it does cover, one would have thought it unnecessary to say that it can have no effect on those it does not cover.
Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 451-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). One
could argue that congressional consent is not necessary for crime control
compacts that do not infringe on federal criminal jurisdiction because they do
not alter the balance of power between the state and federal governments.
However, in the aftermath of Cuyler, this argument has questionable validity
because interstate crime control is an area ripe for national legislation. See
supra note 80.
88. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 507
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974).
In arriving at our decision we do not overlook that the law of the
Union doctrine may be said, under some circumstances, to present
certain theoretical problems, e.g., impermissible delegation of congressional legislative power to the states in cases where Congressional consent precedes the compact. The possibility, however, that
there may be problems in potential cases does not alter our duty to
follow the mandate of Colburn. ... While the Court in Colburn felt it

unnecessary to clearly articulate the basic premise of its decision, we
conclude after careful investigation that the result there was based
upon the implicit finding that the interstate compact involved was a
"statute of the United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(3). Neither logic nor policy justifies a different interpretation
of the substantially similar language in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). Therefore, a case involving the construction of an interstate compact which
requires a judicial determination of the nature and scope of obligations set forth therein "arises" under the "laws" of the United States
within the meaning of § 1331(a).
Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted).
89. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985); see also Cuyler, 449
U.S. at 439 ("'[This compact, by the sanction of Congress, has become a law
of the Union. What further legislation can be desired for judicial action?'"

104 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.9:71

not to suggest that every dispute arising under an interstate compact must be litigated in the federal courts. Under the Supremacy
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 566
(1852))); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) ("[Two States may
not conclude an agreement such as the Pecos River Compact without the consent of the United States Congress. However, once given, 'congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within this Clause into a law of the
United States."' (citation omitted)).
But a compact is after all a legal document.... Just as this Court
has power to settle disputes between States where there is no com-.
pact, it must have final power to pass upon the meaning and validity
of compacts.... A State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a controversy with a sister State.
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); New York v. Hill,
528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000). In addition to precedent of the Supreme Court,
Congress has also provided through legislation that certain interstate compacts fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 33 U.S.C. § 466g1(a) (2002), which provides, in part:
The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction
(concurrent with that of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and concurrent with that of any other court of the United States or
of any State of the United States in matters in which the Supreme
Court, or any other court, has original jurisdiction) of any case or
controversy (1) which involves the construction or application of an interstate compact which (A) in whole or in part relates to the pollution of waters of an interstate river system or any portion
thereof, and (B) expresses the consent of the States signatory to
said compact to be sued in a district court in any case or controversy involving the application or construction thereof....
It is important to note that provisions such as this-and that are contained in
article XII, section C of the ICAOS, discussed infra note 146-are choice of forum requirements, not mandates that all litigation involving an interstate
compact must be conducted in federal court. Such choice of forum restrictions
are not uncommon in interstate compacts; however, they act only to bind the
states and any compact-created administrative body as to the forum for
bringing actions regarding the enforcement and interpretation of a compact
as to the member states. These restrictions would not automatically preclude
a private citizen from suing in state court, nor would they prevent state
courts from enforcing the terms of a compact as a collateral matter to other
litigation. State courts, subject to the Supremacy Clause, would be required
to defer to a compact's terms and conditions just as any federal court is required to do when confronted with compact issues. State court jurisdiction
over compact disputes would presumably extend to enforcing the terms of the
compact on state officials, and even declaring a state statute, rule or constitutional provision void as conflicting with the terms of a compact to which that
state is a member. A state court's jurisdiction would not, of course, extend to
enforcing a compact's terms and conditions on other states, that matter resting clearly with the federal courts.
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Clause, state courts have the same obligation to give force and effect to the provisions of a compact as do the federal courts. It is,
however, ultimately the United States Supreme Court that retains
the final word on the interpretation and application of congressionally approved compacts given their now federalized nature. 90
The interpretation that courts give to interstate compacts effectively controls a state's application of its own law as to the subject
matter of the compact. 91
90. The Supreme Court has considered the status of interstate compacts
in connection with its certiorari jurisdiction. See Del. River Comm'n v.
Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940); Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28. In these cases, the
Court addressed the question of whether a claim based on an interstate compact is cognizable under the Supreme Court's certiorari provisions as applied
to reviewing the judgments of the highest state court where a title, right,
privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of the United States. Colburn, 310 U.S. at 427; Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28. In
Colburn, the Court unequivocally answered this question affirmatively, holding:
[Tihe construction of such a [bi-state] compact sanctioned by Congress by virtue of Article I, § 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution, involves a federal 'title, right, privilege or immunity,' which when
'specially set up and claimed' in a state court may be reviewed here
on certiorari under § 237(b) of the Judicial Code.
310 U.S. at 427. In reaching this interpretation of the certiorari statute, the
Supreme Court in Colburn and its progeny has firmly established that the
construction of a compact, by virtue of congressional consent, presents a federal question. Id.
91. See Dyer, 341 U.S. at 22; see also Alcorn v. Wolfe, 827 F. Supp. 47, 52
(D.D.C. 1993).
Because the compact creating the MWAA was congressionally sanctioned in accordance with the Compact Clause, it is a federal law
subject to federal construction, notwithstanding its genesis in the
enabling acts of Virginia and the District of Columbia.... [T]he
MWAA compact cannot be modified unilaterally by state legislation
and takes precedence over conflicting state law.
Id.; McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Having entered into a contract, a participant state may not unilaterally change its
terms. A Compact also takes precedence over statutory law in member
states."); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d
1312, 1319 (4th Cir. 1983) (explaining the WMATA's "quick take" condemnation powers under the compact are superior to the Maryland Constitution
which expressly prohibited "quick take" condemnations); Malone v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 622 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Because
congressionally sanctioned interstate compacts within the meaning of Art. 1
§ 10 of the Constitution are federal law, state laws inconsistent with the
terms of these compacts are unenforceable as to agencies formed by these
compacts."); Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174
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Although a congressionally approved compact is federalized, it
remains a contract between the member states that must be interpreted and enforced within the four corners of the agreement.
In interpreting and enforcing compacts, the courts are constrained
to effectuate the terms of the compacts (as binding contracts) so
92
long as those terms do not conflict with constitutional principles.
For example, in Texas v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court sustained exceptions to a special master's recommendation to enlarge
the Pecos River Compact Commission, ruling that one consequence of a compact becoming "a law of the United States" is that
"no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms."93
Although congressional consent may change the venue in which
compact disputes are ultimately litigated, it does not change the
controlling nature of the agreement on the member states.
II.

THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION

The emerging understanding of the power of interstate compacts has, over the last fifty years, given rise to a new and potent
form of compact. These new compacts do not directly address the
subject matter of a problem between the states, but rather create
ongoing administrative agencies to do so on behalf of the member
states. These administrative agencies, creations of the member
states, are vested with substantial authority to regulate not only
substantive issues, but also individual state responses to those issues. In a very real sense, such administrative agencies act as a
supra-state, sub-federal governmental body accountable to the collective member states but not subject to the control of any individual member state or the federal government. The Interstate
(8th Cir. 1981) ("One party to an interstate compact may not enact legislation
which would impose burdens upon the compact absent the concurrence of
other signatories."); Seattle Master Builders Assoc. v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1371 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
92. Once a compact between states has been approved, it is the law of the
case binding on the states and its citizens. Congressional consent transforms
interstate compact into a law of the United States. "Unless the compact.., is
somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms, no matter what the equities of the circumstances might otherwise invite." N.Y. State Dairy Foods v. Northeast Dairy Compact Comm'n, 26
F. Supp. 2d 249, 260 (D. Mass. 1998), affd, 198 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
93. 462 U.S. at 564.
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Compact on Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS) is perhaps the
foremost example of the states using the compact device to create
a supra-state administrative agency to regulate an issue of regional and national concern. 9
A. Why a New Compact:FundamentalFlaws in the 1937 Compact
Prior to the adoption of the 1937 Compact, the United States
had no national mechanism to govern the movement of adult offenders between states. Offenders, generally probationers or parolees, could not leave the convicting state, even if residents of
another state. 95 Two exceptions to this general prohibition evolved
as a matter of either practical necessity or political convenience.
First, the so-called "gentleman's agreement" exception existed
where officials in one or more states established informal procedures for the transfer of offenders.9 6 Second, so-called "sundown
parole or probation" conditioned the offender's release from custody or supervision upon the offender leaving the jurisdiction
never to return; a "get out of town" approach to the movement of
offenders. 1 Particularly in the latter case, little consideration was
given to the impact on the receiving state of offenders residing in
that jurisdiction unbeknownst to local or state officials.
It was against this backdrop that, in 1934, Congress authorized the creation of interstate compacts on crime control.9 8 The

94. See

MARIAN

E.

RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS:

A

QUESTION OF

FEDERALISM 300 (1971). Ridgeway argues that once created, states lack individual authority over compact created entities because "laln interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state's authority to another state or
states, or to the agency the several states jointly create to run the compact."
Id.
95. As a practical matter, probation and parole were the only "tools"
available to the states at the time the 1937 Compact was negotiated. The development of alternative and pre-trial programs was a creation of the late
twentieth century. Interview with Carl Wicklund, Executive Director, American Probation and Parole Association (Oct. 13, 2002).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Congressional consent for the ICAOS is based on the consent Congress first granted in 1934 to promote interstate crime control measures:
The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more
States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort
and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to es-
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1937 Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers was one of the first interstate compacts created under
this congressional authorization. By its terms, member states
agreed to certain principles regarding the movement of adult probationers and parolees from one state (the sending state) to another state (the receiving state). Key among the principles were
the following: (1) the member states agreed that under certain circumstances, parolees or probationers could be sent to another
state; (2) the receiving states would assume supervision of parolees or probationers; (3) duly accredited officers of the sending
state could enter the receiving state and apprehend a parolee or
probationer without following formal extradition requirements; (4)
the decision of a sending state to retake a parolee or probationer
was conclusive on the authorities of the receiving state; (5) duly
accredited officers could pass through the territory of any member
state uninhibited in an effort to apprehend or return a parolee or
probationer; and (6) the governor of a member state could designate an official who, acting in concert with officials from other
states, could promulgate rules.9 9
Although the 1937 Compact was simple on its face, its operation became haphazard, difficult, and fragmented in recent
years.100 As the population of the United States became more mobile, so too did parolees and probationers. The creation of a variety
of "alternative sentencing" options, such as suspended sentencing,
deferred sentencing and programs promoting treatment in lieu of
conviction, complicated the interstate transfer and supervision of
offenders. The 1937 Compact was silent on regulating those in al-

.tablish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable
for making effective such agreements and compacts.
4 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 1997). This was, with slight amendment, the congressional consent on which the first interstate compact for offender supervision was proposed beginning in 1937. See supra note 7.
99. It must be noted that the Supreme Court has never recognized the
right of a probationer or parolee to have their supervision transferred to another state. Thus, the movement of adult offenders is not governed by the
constitutional right to travel, but exclusively by interstate agreements.
100. For a general discussion on the problems of the 1937 Compact, see
Constance Clem, Barbara Krauth & Larry Link, National Institute of Corrections Information Center, U.S. Department of Justice, A Field Evaluation of
the Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole: Findings from an NIC Survey 2 (1998), available at http://www.nicic.orgipubs/1998/014241.pdf.
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ternative sentencing programs and those in supervised pre-trial
status who constitute a significant and growing population.101
Compounding the ineffectiveness of the 1937 Compact was
the dramatic rise in the number of parolees and probationers as a
result of the push throughout the 1980s and 1990s to get tough on
crime. 102 Officials in member states increasingly ignored reporting
requirements and the rules dealing with notice and transfer of supervision. Probationers and parolees were sent to other states
without any forewarning-or warning at all. Probation and parole
officers, overwhelmed by their own local caseloads and facing the
widely disparate systems of other states, denied permission for
out-of-state offenders notwithstanding the mandates of the 1937
Compact. 103 This fragmented system made it almost impossible to
101. See Brian A. Reaves & Jacob Perez, PretrialRelease of Felony Defendants, 1992, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics NCJ148818 (November 1994), available at http//:www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdflnprp92
.pdf. According to this bulletin, in 1992 (the last year for which figures are
available) "[a]n estimated 63% of the defendants who had State felony
charges filed against them in the Nation's 75 most populous counties ... were
released" from pre-trial detention. Id. at 1. Approximately one-third of these
defendants were "rearrested for a new offense, failed to appear in court as
scheduled, or committed some other violation that resulted in the revocation
of their pre-trial release." Id. Some eight percent of released offenders for
whom the court issued a bench warrant were still fugitives from justice after
one year. Id. "Twenty-seven percent of released defendants had at least one
prior felony conviction. . . ." Id.
102. See Lauren E. Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States,
2001, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics NCJ-195669 (Aug.
2002), available at http//:www.ojpusdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus0l.pdf. According
to this report, in calendar year 2001 there were 3,932,751 offenders on probation and 731,147 offenders on parole. Id. at 1. This represents a 2.8% increase
in probation caseloads and a 1.0% increase in parole caseloads over calendar
year 2000. Id. The Bureau of Statistics estimates that from 1995 to 2001 probation caseloads increased at an annualized rate of 3.4%, while parole
caseloads increased at an annualized rate of 1.2% for the same period. Id. For
the period 1995-2001, prison populations increased at an annualized rate of
3.6%, while jail populations increased at an annualized rate of 3.7% for the
same period. Id. In 1998, the National Institute of Corrections estimated that
some 250,000 of those currently on probation or parole will have their status
transferred to another state under the two now existing interstate compacts.
Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, Advisory Group Report and Recommendations, Phase I 8 (Nat'l Institute of Corrections, June 29 & 30, 1998) available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/
1998/013120.pdf.
103. Approximately 3,285 different local authorities operating under some
861 different agencies oversaw probationers and parolees traveling inter-
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account for offenders, much less provide any meaningful supervision of, or control over, their post-offense conduct.
Amplifying these practical problems was the lack of any formal governing structure provided in the 1937 Compact, or any
structure formally recognized by the states. 104 Although the 1937
Compact provided that each governor could "designate an officer
who, acting jointly with like officers of other contracting states...
shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed
necessary," there was no formal definition of the powers or duties
of any joint body.105 Administration of the compact fell, essentially
by default, to the Parole and Probation Compact Administrator's
Association (PPCAA). The Association--comprised of state officials
from throughout the nation-promulgated rules and policies
which sought to implement the spirit of the compact. 0 6 However,
state. National Institute of Corrections, Context for Amending the Parole and
Probation Interstate Compact, at http://www.nicic.orgIDownloads/Other/back

ground.htm (revised in June 2003).
104. Member states to the 1937 Compact pay annual dues of $400 to the
PPCAA. This is the only payment states make to a national body regulating
that compact.

THE PAROLE AND PROBATION COMPACT ADM'RS' ASS'N MANUAL,

ch.1, § 1.7 (2001), availableat http://www.ppcaa.net.
105. Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers,
1935-1936 R.I. Pub. Laws 2381.
106. It is arguable whether the PPCAA ever had authority to promulgate
administrative and regulatory rules binding on the states in their sovereign
capacity. The 1937 Compact authorized the governor of each state to "designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other contracting
states, if and when appointed, shall promulgate ... rules and regula-

tions .... ." Id. § 5. As compacts are solemn contracts, they must be interpreted within the confines of the agreement and, thus, a specific delegation of
a member state's authority would seem warranted. Whether the PPCAA constitutes a group of "like officers" authorized to promulgate such rules is questionable given its membership. Membership in the PPCAA is not limited to
the gubernatorially appointed state officials authorized by the 1937 compact
to promulgate rules, but extends to a fairly broad range of individuals within
each state, including: deputy administrators, coordinators, compact correspondents, and parole officers. THE PAROLE AND PROBATION COMPACT ADM'RS'
AsS'N MANUAL ch. 1, § 1.7 (2001), available at http://www.ppcaa.net. As the
PPCAA acknowledges:
The object of the Association is to bring the officers of the respective
States, Territories, and Administrative Sub-Divisions signatories to
the Interstate Compact for Supervision of Parolees and Probationers,
into an organization through which they may become personally acquainted with each other, to exchange information and to cooperate
together for the effective carrying out of the provisions of the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, the Compacts entered
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into by and among the contracting States, Territories and Administrative Sub-Divisions, and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder and to secure uniformity in interpretation, practice, and
procedure.
Id. Thus, the PPCAA is more akin to a professional association than an interstate commission authorized to bind the states to specific policies and procedures that can, in some cases, supersede substantive state law, including a
state's constitution. There is no indication of any formal state recognition of,
or delegation of authority to, the PPCAA outside of the bare fact that the
states have acquiesced to its assumed role. Whether acquiescence constitutes
state recognition of the PPCAA as the explicit governing authority of the
1937 Compact has never been litigated. One additional complication may be
that the rules promulgated by the PPCAA were seldom done pursuant to a
formal rulemaking procedure as outlined in the ICAOS and were frequently
done by employees of the state compact administrator. See, e.g., Interstate
Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, 1935-1936 R.I.
Pub. Laws 2381. While individual members of the PPCAA may have been
acting under color of state authority, the solemnity and formality of interstate compacts as contracts between sovereign states would appear to demand a higher standard. After all, compacts are not mere administrative
agreements or arrangements. Given that the 1937 Compact was federalized
by the consent of Congress, its rules are enforceable on the states under the
Supremacy Clause. Therefore, it seems rudimentary that a specific delegation
of the state's power to a state official is needed if that official is to, "acting
jointly" with other state officials, negotiate rules that are binding on the individual states. Id. If a formal grant of the state's sovereign authority is not
needed in administering compacts, arguably any state employee can take actions detrimental to the sovereign status of a state, e.g., adopting rules ceding
a portion of the state's sovereignty. This would seem contrary to the very
purpose of compacts, which are to bind the states in formal contracts. The
courts have long recognized the rules of the PPCAA because no one has specifically challenged its rulemaking authority relative to the states. Courts
appear to recognize the PPCAA's authority by default; that is, they have assumed the validity of its actions because no one has challenged those actions
or engaged in any formal analysis of the PPCAA's authority. See Doe v. Ward,
124 F. Supp. 2d 900, 913 (W.D. Pa. 2000) ("The regulations promulgated by
the Parole and Probation Compact Administrators' Association ...also support[] our reading of the statute."); see, e.g., ALM Corp. v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Region II, 974 F.2d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 1992) (judicial deference is given to agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute whether it is
interpreting statute directly or through the promulgation of a rule or regula"); see also Aveline v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 729 A.2d 1254, 1254
tion .
(Pa. 1999). Absent a specific grant of authority, the most one may argue is
that the PPCAA acts in an "agency" capacity to the states or that the states
and those affected by the rules have a right to "detrimentally rely" on the actions of the PPCAA. However, given that compacts are not contracts for the
production of widgets but fundamentally can alter the sovereignty of a state,
the authors suggest that more is needed. This issue is, however, largely rendered moot as to the member states of the ICAOS because the compact specifically designates who has the authority to make binding rules and under
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as an association with questionable legal standing or political
clout, it was nearly impossible to obtain state compliance with the
rules. 107 The PPCAA was in the untenable position of attempting
to administer and enforce a contract between sovereign entitiesthe states-through an association of state officials whose enforcement authority was open to debate. 108 The efficacy and enwhat circumstances. ICAOS, art. V, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20
Compact%20Language.pdf.
107. Constance Clem, Barbara Krauth & Larry Link, National Institute of
Corrections Information Center, U.S. Department of Justice, A Field Evaluation of the Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole: Findings from an
NIC Survey 2 (1998), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1998/014241.pdf.
The report found, in part, that:
1. Interstate tensions, policy differences, and serious inefficiencies
seem to characterize current Compact operations.
2. There is a philosophical split between those who believe that
Compact rules should be strictly followed and - in addition - enforced, and those who believe the Compact has become too rulebound, too inflexible to accommodate special circumstances.
3. Very few Compact offices have reliable data on violations of probation or parole committed by Compact transferees.
4. Agency staff are generally satisfied with operations within their
own states, but sometimes extremely frustrated in their dealings with other states.
Id. The report concluded that rule "[vliolations were described as rampant,
suggesting a need for methodical review and modification of rules, as well as
increased enforcement and accountability among states that are party to the
Compact." Id. at 3.
108. For example, the PPCAA's manual on dispute resolution called for
states to informally resolve their differences. If that was not possible, the
PPCAA provided for a formal complaint process that would result in an Executive Council ruling on the dispute. If the "offending state" failed to comply
with the Council's ruling, the rules called for the following actions:
a. Seek the assistance of the offending state's legal counsel.
b. Seek the assistance of the offending state's Attorney General.
c. Seek the assistance of the United States Attorney General.
d. Orchestrate a succession of letters from neutral states urging reconsideration by the offending state.
e. Write a letter of reprimand to the offending state's Compact
Administrator or Deputy Compact Administrator with copies to the Administrator's immediate superior.
f. Write a letter of reprimand to the offending state's Compact
Administrator or Deputy Compact Administrator with copies to the Administrators' immediate superior and the Governor.
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forceability of the rules adopted under the auspices of the 1937
Compact was in serious doubt, as evidenced by how many state
and local officials ignored the rules. 109
Against this backdrop of compounding failures, several states
began considering and adopting legislative regulations, effectively
restricting the movement of interstate probationers and parolees.
For example, several states adopted sex offender registration restrictions on out-of-state probationers and parolees. 110 Colorado
adopted legislation prohibiting "the travel of a supervised person
who is a nonresident of this state... without written notification
from the administrator of the interstate compact of acceptance of

g.

Write a letter of complaint to the Governor of the offending
state.
h. Seek the assistance of the Legislature of the offending state.
i.
Request a vote of censure by the full membership of the
PPCAA.
j.
Request the withdrawal of the offending states from the
Compact through the appropriate legislative process.
k. Take necessary and appropriate legal action.
1. Other - as the particular situation suggests.
THE PAROLE AND PROBATION COMPACT ADM'RS' ASS'N MANUAL, ch. 3, § 1-102
(2001) available at http://www.ppcaa.net. As is clear from the list of possible
"actions," there was very little the PPCAA could actually do to effectuate a
change in the behavior of the offending state.
109. For example, the 1998 field evaluation conducted by the National Institute of Corrections noted that, "[judges] often do not know enough about
Compact guidelines, though their decisions affect Compact operations. Respondents noted that, for example, when judges fail to follow Compact regulations, it is almost impossible to have violators returned." Clem, supra note
107, at 11.
110. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(6) (Michie 2002), which provides in part:
Any person who has been convicted in a court of another state or territory, a court of the United States, or a court martial of the United
States Armed Forces of a sex crime or criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, or who has been committed as a sexually violent
predator under the laws of another state, laws of a territory, or federal laws, shall be informed at the time of his or her relocation to
Kentucky of the duty to register under this section, and to comply
with the requirements of subsection (4)(b) of this section, by the interstate compact officer of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice.
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the supervised person into a private treatment program.""' The
Colorado statute was the result of state officials having no notice
that offenders from other states were residing in local communities or participating in in-state treatment programs. 112 Several
states enacted, or threatened to enact, laws prohibiting the transfer of individuals within high-risk groups, such as sex offenders,
further eroding the enforceability of the 1937 Compact." 3 By 1998,
it was clear that an atmosphere had evolved in which the states
could, with relative impunity, ignore the Compact and its rules
with little fear of repercussions.1 4 In fact, this is precisely what
15
happened. The 1937 Compact had outlived its usefulness."
111.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-27.1-101(3)(b) (2002). The reason for adopting

the restrictions was contained in the legislative finding to the statute, which
provided, in part:
The general assembly further finds that although Colorado is a
signatory to the interstate compact for parolee supervision, more information concerning out-of-state offenders is necessary for the protection of the citizens of Colorado, and it may be necessary to further
regulate programs that provide treatment and services to such persons.
Id. § 17-27.1-101(I)(b).
112. See Clem, supra note 107. The report quoted a county administrator
who observed, "'[t]oo many bodies show up without advance approval,' and
'[r]ejected bodies end up in the state anyway, and they have no on-site supervision.'" Id. at 13.
113. In Doe v. Ward, the court held that Pennsylvania's attempt to impose
higher restrictions on out-of-state sex offenders than it imposed on in-state
sex offenders violated the terms of the 1937 Compact and rules adopted pursuant to the compact. 124 F. Supp. 2d 900, 900 (W.D. Pa. 2000). In 1997,
Pennsylvania's parole board issued a policy mandating that all out-of-state
offenders convicted of certain offenses register with the state police and submit to community notification. Id. at 905. This policy was eventually adopted
by the state legislature and codified. 61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 331.1 (1999). In
striking down the law, the court concluded that the 1937 Compact was, "as a
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, [both] a federal law as well as
state law." Ward, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 912. As such, it was subject to federal
court jurisdiction and federal court construction. The court further concluded
that "the Compact requires Pennsylvania to provide Doe with the same process as is provided to in-state offenders before subjecting him to community
notification." Id. at 911. The court reached this conclusion, in part, because
the rules promulgated under the Compact required that the treatment of outof-state offenders "be governed by the same standards that prevail for its own
[receiving state] probationers and parolees." Id. at 912 (quoting 61 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 321 (1999)).
114. Recently, the failure of compact officials in Texas to comply fully with
the 1937 Compact did not escape unnoticed by the North Dakota Supreme
Court. In Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 232-33, 236 (N.D. 2002), that
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court reinstated a wrongful death suit against Texas state officials finding
that the plaintiffs established a prima facie tort claim and that Texas officials
had sufficient minimum contacts with North Dakota under the state's long
arm statute to establish jurisdiction. That court ruled, in part:
[Tihe daughters' complaint alleges claims against the Texas defendants for wrongful death, survivorship, and constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The daughters allege the Texas defendants
unreasonably and recklessly failed to fully disclose Lawrence's background and extensive criminal history when providing transfer information to North Dakota officials, the Texas defendants
unreasonably and recklessly failed to comply with the appropriate
standard of care under the applicable policies and procedures governing supervision of parolees, and the Texas defendants acted in an
unreasonable and reckless manner in developing and implementing
policies and procedures for determining when a parole violator
should be returned from a receiving state to Texas. The daughters
allege the Texas defendants' conduct proximately caused the deaths
of Gordon and Barbara Erickstad, which occurred in North Dakota.
Under these allegations and in this posture, the daughters' wrongful
death and survivorship claims against the Texas defendants are sufficient to allege prima facie torts within or without this state causing
injury to another person within this state ....
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, the Texas
defendants effectively sent a dangerous parolee to North Dakota
without fully disclosing his dangerous propensities. The Texas defendants' affirmative action of asking North Dakota to supervise
Lawrence, a Texas parolee, constitutes activity in which they purposely availed themselves of the privilege of sending Lawrence to
North Dakota.
...Viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the daughters, we conclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendants does not offend traditional notions
of substantial justice, fair play, or due process of law.
Id. at 232, 236 (footnote and citations omitted). Texas filed a petition for writ
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision. One ground asserted by Texas was that the Hansen
decision "now forces States to weigh this important objective [establishing a
cooperative system for transfer of adult offenders] against a substantial burden they did not bargain for in joining the Compact [on Adult Offender Supervision]." Scott v. Hansen, Docket No. 02-657, petition for certiorari 10
(Nov. 1, 2002). The "substantial burden" referred to in the petition is subjecting officials in a sending state to the in personum jurisdiction of a receiving
state should an offender commit subsequent offenses. However, the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari of the North Dakota Supreme Court decision.
Scott v. Hansen, 537 U.S. 1108, 1108 (2003).
115. James G. Gentry, The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision: Parolee and ProbationerSupervision Enters the Twenty-First Century,
32 McGEORGE L. REv. 533 passim (2001).
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B. A New Structure to Address Old Problems
Beginning in 1998, under the auspices of the National Institute of Corrections and the Council of State Governments, a concerted effort was made to substantially amend or completely
replace the 1937 Compact. 116 The end result of that process was
the ICAOS. The importance of the ICAOS must be viewed within
the context of both its policy implications and its legal standing.
By adopting the new compact, each of the member states has
ceded control (and a certain degree of sovereignty) over the interstate movement of adult offenders. In light of Cuyler and subsequent cases, the ICAOS, and the rules adopted by its newly
formed Interstate Commission, function as "the law of the United
States" applicable to the member states under both the terms of
the compact and through the operation of the Supremacy
Clause. 117 Adoption of the ICAOS has, in a very tangible sense,
"nationalized" and "federalized" the movement of adult offenders
with state convictions, while simultaneously retaining policy direction and operational control in the member states.
The difference between the old compact and the new compact,
however, does not rest so much in the "federalization" of a substantive area of law, but in the creation of a formal and powerful
administrative and enforcement structure that can supersede in116. Prior to convening a drafting team in 1998, the NIC conducted a twoyear study of the 1937 Compact. See Interstate Compact for the Supervision
of Parolees and Probatibners advisory group report and recommendations
phase I, available at http://www.nicic.org/resources/topics/InterstateCompact
.aspx. Among the recommendations were:
* The compact administrator not a deputy or clerical person
should represent the state on a nationwide governing commission. This would ensure policymaker level participation
for the states and territories.
* A national governance commission to regulate the compact.
* Provisions that address governance, the role of an executive
committee, mandatory funding of the national commission,
permanent commission staffing, national data collection
standards, and commission authority to make binding rules
and regulations.
Id.
117. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985) ("The agreement is a
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause
and thus is a federal law subject to federal constructions." (citation omitted));
see also Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 149 (2001).
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dividual state autonomy. 118 The states have effectively created a
sub-federal, supra-state governing body-an intermediate and
particularized authority-to manage issues and resolve problems
relative to the interstate movement of adult offenders. It is the
creation of this new structure that may well pave the way for future compacts that can address other supra-state, sub-federal issues.
One need only compare the ICAOS with the 1937 Compact to
immediately recognize the differences. Where the 1937 Compact
addressed policy issues concerning the interstate movement of parolees and probationers, the ICAOS is silent as to the specifics of
such policy matters. Where the 1937 Compact had scant detail regarding governance and management of compact affairs, the
ICAOS is largely dedicated to creating an elaborate governance
structure of state councils and an Interstate Commission to oversee the Compact. Where the 1937 Compact was a compact to regulate the movement of parolees and probationers, the ICAOS is a
compact that governs the movement of adult offenders by regulating the conduct of member states.
Under the ICAOS, regulation of Compact operations is vested
in two bodies: state councils that address intrastate affairs and an
Interstate Commission that handles interstate affairs, administers the compact nationally, and establishes regulatory rules governing state officials in their management of adult offenders. The
state councils provide Compact administrators and state policymakers with a forum for addressing intrastate issues, such as ensuring adequate funding for Compact operations and remedying
intrastate activity that could pull the state out of compliance with
the ICAOS.119 As the movement of adult offenders embraces all
118. The Cuyler reasoning applied equally to the 1937 Compact because it
rested upon the congressional consent contained in the 1934 crime control
act. Consequently, the 1937 Compact was also the "law of the United States."
See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440, 442 (1981). The substantive difference between the ICAOS and the 1937 Compact rests on breadth of authority
given to the interstate commission.
119. According to ICAOS:
Each member state shall create a State Council for Interstate
Adult Offender Supervision which shall be responsible for the appointment of the commissioner who shall serve on the Interstate
Commission from that state. Each State Council shall appoint as its
commissioner the Compact Administrator from that state to serve on
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three branches of state government and many community interests, the state councils provide a much needed forum for the coordination and intrastate management of interstate adult offenders.
Notwithstanding the intrastate function of the state councils,
the true power of the ICAOS rests in its interstate governing
structure and particularly its new Commission. The vast majority
of the ICAOS is dedicated to establishing the Commission and defining its powers. The ICAOS vests in the Commission significant
rulemaking, management, operational, and enforcement authority. As noted in the preamble to the ICAOS:
It is the purpose of this compact and the Interstate Commission created hereunder, through means of joint and
cooperative action among the compacting states: to provide the framework for the promotion of public safety and
protect the rights of victims through the control and regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the
community; to provide for the effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending
and receiving state; and to equitably distribute the costs,
benefits, and obligations of the compact among the compacting states. 120
Pursuant to article I of the ICAOS, the Interstate Commission
is charged with the following duties:
[El stablish uniform procedures to manage the movement
the Interstate Commission in such capacity under or pursuant to
applicable law of the member state. While each member state may
determine the membership of its own State Council, its membership
must include at least one representative from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, victims groups and compact administrators. Each compacting state retains the right to
determine the qualifications of the Compact Administrator who shall
be appointed by the state council or by the Governor in consultation
with the Legislature and Judiciary. In addition to appointment of its
commissioner to the National Interstate Commission, each state
council shall exercise oversight and advocacy concerning its participation in Interstate Commission activities and other duties as may
be determined by each member state including but not limited to,
development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the
compact within that state.
ICAOS, art. IV, http://www.adultcompact.orgAdult%20Compact%2OLan
guage.pdf.
120. Id. art. I.
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between states of the adults placed under community supervision and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections or other
criminal justice agencies which will promulgate rules to
achieve the purposes of this compact; ensure an opportunity for input and timely notice to victims and to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or
to relocate across state lines; establish a system of uniform data collection, access to information on active cases
by authorized criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of Compact activities to the heads of state councils, state executive, judicial and legislative branches and
criminal justice administrators; monitor compliance with
rules governing the movement of offenders and initiate
interventions to address and correct non-compliance; and
coordinate training and education regarding regulations
of interstate movement of offenders for officials involved
in such activity. 121
Under the ICAOS, there is little regarding the interstate
movement of adult offenders that does not fall within the purview
of the Commission. The Commission can make rules regulating
the terms and conditions under which the supervision of adult offenders can be transferred between states,1 2 2 collect and manage
data, 123 assist in dispute resolution,12 4 and bring enforcement actions against a member state that violates the terms and conditions of the Compact.125 In effect, the Compact governs the conduct
of state officials in carrying out the provisions of the Compact and
its rules. The scope of the Compact-as an instrument governing
individual state conduct-is expansive.
The use of interstate commissions as a mechanism for implementing and regulating an interstate compact is not novel. 26

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. art. VIII.
Id.
Id. art. IX.

125.

Id. art. XII.

126. E.g., Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, art.
IV, ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-8-202 (Michie 2000); Connecticut River Flood Control Compact, art. II, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-99 (1999); Great Lakes Basin
Compact, art. IV, 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 145/1 (1993); Compact for Education,
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Many regulatory compacts-such as the Interstate Compact on
Insurance Receiverships and the Central Midwest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact-utilize the interstate commission governance model.127 Likewise, many development and water
compacts use interstate commissions or boards of authority to
manage the affairs of those compacts. 128 However, the Interstate
Commission created by the ICAOS is fundamentally different
129
from most other compact-created commissions in three regards.
First, the ICAOS has a significant reach, potentially affecting
0
the lives of millions of people classified as "adult offenders."' 3 The
ICAOS specifically provides that the Commission shall "oversee,
supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of offenders
subject to the terms of [the] compact and any by-laws adopted and
art. III, IV, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 15-1901 (2002); Midwest Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Compact, art. III, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 3.751 (West
1994). Many of the commissions created under these compacts have policy
advisory roles and not actual management roles. See id.
127. Id.
128. E.g., Compact Between Missouri and Illinois Creating the Bi-State
Development Agency and the Bi-State Metropolitan District, art. III, 45 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 100/1 (1993); Chickasaw Trail Economic Development Compact,
art. III, MISS. CODE ANN. § 57-36-1 (1999); Delaware-New Jersey Compact,
art. IV, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17,

§ 1701 (1995).

129. Compare Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact Act, 45 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 160/5 (Supp. 2003), with ICAOS, http://www.adultcompact
.org/Adult%2OCompact%20Language.pdf. The Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact is similar in model to the ICAOS. Both compacts create interstate commissions to manage their affairs. Moreover, both compacts vest
their respective commissions with broad rulemaking authority. However,
whereas the Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact provides for termination should a state default on its obligations, the ICAOS empowers its Interstate Commission to seek injunctive relief in federal court, suspend or
terminate member states, or impose fines, fees and costs. This is a significant
enforcement power conferred only on the ICAOS Commission and not contained in any other compact.
130. As used in the ICAOS, "adult offender" is derived from two definitions. See ICAOS, art. II, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact
%20Language.pdf. The ICAOS defines an adult as "both individuals legally
classified as adults and juveniles treated as adults by court order, statute, or
operation of law." Id. cl. 1. The ICAOS defines an offender as "an adult placed
under, or subject to supervision as the result of the commission of a criminal
offense and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections, or other criminal justice agencies." Id. cl. 9. By
using the phrase "commission of a criminal offense," the ICAOS sweeps into
its regulatory scheme offenders who may be in pretrial or alternative sentencing status.
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rules promulgated by the compact commission." 131 The Commission is not merely advisory, nor is its authority questionable;
rather, it has clear management authority and responsibility. The
rules adopted by the Commission apply not only to traditional parolees and probationers, but also to those in a pre-trial status and
those subject to alternative sentencing programs.132 The decision
to use the term "adult offenders" rather than "parolees and probationers" was very intentional. The ICAOS is intended to give the
Interstate Commission authority to regulate the movement of the
full breadth of the adult offender population, not just individual
subsets of that population. Moreover, the language of the ICAOS
is flexible, giving the Commission the ability to adapt to future
developments in adult corrections without having to resort to the
arduous task of amending the Compact.
In carrying out its regulatory activities, the ICAOS charges
the Commission with specific responsibilities, the most important
of which is rulemaking. 3 3 The ICAOS Commission may promulgate rules addressing a wide variety of issues including notice requirements for victims, offender registration and compliance,
violations and returns, transfer procedures, collection of restitution and fees from offenders, data collection and reporting, supervision levels in receiving states, dispute resolution, and transition
from the 1937 Compact to the ICAOS.134 Through its rulemaking
authority, the ICAOS Commission potentially can regulate all activities surrounding the movement of adult offenders and how
35
states conduct themselves in managing that population.1

131. Id. art. V, cl. 3.
132. See supra note 130.
133. Article V of ICAOS discusses the full range of Commission authority
including the authority to establish offices, hire staff, adopt by-laws, establish
a budget, levy costs on the states, coordinate education of state officials, report annually to the three branches of each state's government, and establish
uniform standards for reporting, collecting and exchanging data. ICAOS, art.
V, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact%2OLanguage.pdf.
134. Id. art. VIII.
135. The rulemaking authority of the Commission is extraordinarily
broad. It is not, however, without some checks and balances. The Compact
allows states to reject rules. "If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same
manner used to adopt the compact, then such rule shall have no further force
and effect in any compacting state." Id. If a majority of the compacting states
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Second, under its broad rulemaking authority the ICAOS
Commission has the power to regulate both the movement of indi136
viduals (adult offenders) and the conduct of the member states.
The ICAOS Commission is empowered to "promulgate rules which
shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact." 137 The ICAOS arguably extends the
principles of the Cuyler decision beyond the specific language of
the Compact to encompass all of the rules and actions undertaken
by the Commission in the implementation and enforcement of the
Compact. The rules and regulations will supersede any state laws
in conflict, and a state will no longer be able to pass legislation
that whittles away at compact regulations. 138
Third, it is important to note that the ICAOS creates a regulatory scheme more than it regulates the actual movement of
do not reject the rule, the rule is in full force and effect in all states notwithstanding an individual state's action.
136. The Commission's rulemaking authority is outlined in article VIII of
the Compact. All rules adopted by the Commission "shall substantially conform to the principles of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S.
section 551, et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.S. app.
2, section 1 et seq., as many be amended ....All Rules and amendments
shall become binding as of the date specified in each Rule or amendment." Id.
By contrast, the interstate commission created under the Central Midwest
Radioactive Waste Compact is empowered to enter agreements for the disposal of waste and may license certain facilities. E.g., art. V, § (d), 45 ILL.
COMP.STAT. 140/1 (1997). However, that commission does not possess broad
rulemaking power and under the explicit terms of the compact each state retains the right to enforce its laws, rules and regulations "pertaining [to] the
packaging and transportation of waste generated within or passing through
its borders." Id.; see also Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, art.
VII, which provides, in part:
Nothing in this Compact shall be construed to limit the powers of
any signatory State, or to repeal or prevent the enactment of any legislation or the enforcement of any requirement by any signatory
State, imposing additional conditions and restrictions to further
lessen or prevent the pollution of waters within its jurisdiction.
Id.
137. ICAOS, art. V, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact%20
Language.pdf.
138. There is one exception to this statement. Acting in concert, a majority
of the legislatures of the member states may reject a rule promulgated by the
Interstate Commission. The rule would then have no force or effect on any
member state. Id. art. VIII. Outside of this provision and various Compact
requirements of the rule adoption process, there is no limitation on the Commission's rulemaking authority.
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adult offenders. The ICAOS is directed at implementing a governance structure that can effectively regulate a particular activity.
For example, unlike the 1937 Compact, nowhere in the ICAOS is
there any explicit provision actually regulating the movement of
adult offenders. Where the 1937 Compact required "judicial and
administrative authorities of a state party to [the] compact (hereto
called "sending state"), to permit any person convicted of an offense within such state and placed on probation or released on parole to reside in any other state party to this compact (hereto
called "receiving state")," the ICAOS leaves to the Commission the
duty of adopting rules that meet the policy objectives of the Compact. 139

Inasmuch as the ICAOS is focused on the governance of state
conduct more than the actual regulation of adult offenders, 140 the
Commission has been given a number of enforcement tools to ensure that member states comply with both the letter and spirit of
the Compact.141 Historically, the single largest challenge with using interstate compacts has been providing flexible management
of compact affairs while enforcing compact provisions on the
member states. Although compacts are contracts within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the Constitution, the parties to the
compacts have a unique status.142
To address this issue, the ICAOS Commission has been given
significant enforcement power. For example, the Commission pos-

139. Compare ICAOS, http://www.adultcompact.org/Adult%20Compact%
20Language.pdf, with 1937 Compact, supra discussion pp. 107-14. The only
language in ICAOS that can be construed as "regulatory" as opposed to governance in orientation is the following statement:
The compacting states recognize that there is no "right" of any offender to live in another state and that duly accredited officers of a
sending state may at all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any offender under supervision -subject to the
provisions of this compact and bylaws and rules promulgated hereunder.
ICAOS, art. I, http://www.adultcompact.orgAdult%20Compact%20Language.
pdf.
140. The Commission clearly has the authority to regulate the movement
of adult offenders under article V. See generally id. art. V. However, as noted
previously, that activity has been reserved for the Commission's rulemaking
authority rather than contained in the text of the Compact itself.
141. Id. art. XII, § B.
142. See supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
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sesses the power to impose on a defaulting state fines, fees and
costs "in such amounts as are deemed to be reasonable as fixed by
the Interstate Commission." 4 3 The Commission can provide remedial training and technical assistance in an effort to bring a defaulting state into compliance. 144 The ICAOS Commission can also
suspend or terminate a defaulting state from the Compact. 4 5 Additionally, the Commission can, by majority vote, initiate legal action in the federal courts to force compliance with the Compact
and its by-laws and rules. 14 6 The most likely form of legal action
would be affirmative injunctive relief against a defaulting state to
compel compliance with the terms of the Compact.
Of the enforcement tools provided to the Commission, the
provisions allowing for fines, suspension or termination from the
Compact, and federal litigation are the most unique. One must recall that compacts like the ICAOS are not only contracts between
member states, but having received congressional consent are,
under Cuyler and its progeny, the "the law[s] of the United
States." 147 The use of these enforcement tools by the ICAOS Commission has practical, legal and policy implications, not the least
of which is the fact that the Compact creates an intermediate gov-

143. See ICAOS, art. XII, § B.
144. Id.
145. Id. In the event the Commission moves to suspend or terminate a
member state, certain procedures must be followed. Specifically, the Commission can suspend or terminate a member state "only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance.., have been exhausted." Id. The
Commission must then give a notice of suspension to "the Governor, Chief
Justice, or Chief Judicial Officer of the state; the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state's legislature, and the State Council." Id. Termination from the compact requires a majority vote of the Commission. Id.
146. Article XII, § C of the ICAOS provides:
The Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the Members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the Federal District where the Interstate Commission has its
offices to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Compact, its
duly promulgated Rules and By-laws, against any Compacting State
in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys fees.
Id. art. XII, § C.
147. See supra Part I.C.2.
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ernment entity whose authority is clearly supra-state, subfederal.148
The ICAOS raises interesting challenges to traditional notions of state sovereignty and federal control. By adopting the
ICAOS, member states have agreed to submit themselves to the
Commission in managing the movement of adult offenders. 149 The
Commission, through its extensive rulemaking authority, stands
over the states in relation to the subject matter of the Compact.
No state legislature of any member state, for example, may pass a
statute that unilaterally attempts to regulate the movement of
adult offenders, or that establishes a state policy at odds with the
national policy established by the Commission. The act of any
state attempting to do so would be void under the Supremacy
Clause and subject the state to penalties under the explicit terms
of the Compact. While other compact-created commissions have
some modicum of enforcement power, 150 no other compact vests in
a state-created interstate commission the enforcement authority
that the ICAOS affords its Commission. Moreover, no other compact ties the commission's enforcement power so closely to the authority of the federal judiciary.
C. Why the ICAOS Model is Importantfor the Future
Arguably, interstate compacts violate the pure ideal of federalism to the extent that they allow for the creation of a third tier,
or intermediate, governing authority that is neither state in scope
nor federal in nature. However, with the United States becoming
148. Article V of the ICAOS provides, in part, that the Interstate Commission has the power "[t]o enforce compliance with compact provisions, Interstate Commission rules, and by-laws, using all necessary and proper means,
including but not limited to, the use ofjudicial process." ICAOS, art. V, cl. 4.
149. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 41-42
(1994) ("As part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States
agreed to the power sharing, coordination, and unified action that typify
Compact Clause creations."); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v.
Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 315 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Each State's sovereign will is circumscribed by that of the
other States in the compact and circumscribed further by the veto power relinquished to Congress in the Constitution.").
150. For example, the Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact, art.
XII, § B.1, empowers its interstate commission to terminate a state that is in
default of the performance of its obligations or responsibilities under the
compact. E.g., NEB. REV. ST. § 44-6501 (1998).
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increasingly integrated, rendering state boundaries largely irrelevant to many issues, compacts like the ICAOS may well prove to
be an apt mechanism for developing state-based solutions to supra-state problems. Formal compacts modeled after the ICAOS
provide two advantages to informal arrangements or federal preemption.
First, formal compacts creating intermediate governing authorities, such as interstate commissions, allow states to create
enforcement mechanisms ensuring both sufficient regulation of a
particular activity and sufficient enforcement of the compact's
terms and conditions on the member states. As noted, the true
uniqueness of the ICAOS rests in the creation of an administrative governance structure that possesses a significant tool chest of
rulemaking and enforcement powers, directed mainly at regulating individual state action. The ICAOS, by vesting an Interstate
Commission of state officials with authority that is tied closely to
the federal courts, ensures that the terms of the Compact can be
enforced against the member states through judicial action if necessary. Absent this nexus, the ICAOS would not be significantly
different than other compacts, and would be only marginally more
effective than its 1937 counterpart. The ICAOS model effectively
prevents individual state legislatures and state officials from unilaterally regulating supra-state issues.
Second, when properly constructed, compacts such as the
ICAOS enable the member states to retain significant policy control over, and practical regulation of, the particular issue addressed by the compact. For example, in the case of the ICAOS,
the Interstate Commission is comprised exclusively of state officials who may act on behalf of their respective states in creating
and enforcing rules applicable to all member states. 151 This is an
effective means for preventing federal preemption in areas traditionally within the purview of the states' interests. History demonstrates that states are most at risk of federal preemption when
151. Article III of the ICAOS provides that the Interstate Commission
shall consist of Commissioners selected and appointed by resident members
of the State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision for each state
and that each compacting state represented at any meeting of the Interstate
Commission is entitled to one vote. Id. art. III. The Compact further provides
that each State Council shall appoint as its Commissioner the Compact Administrator from that state to serve on the Interstate Commission in such capacity under or pursuant to applicable law of the member state. Id. art. IV.
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they fail to timely and effectively address supra-state, sub-federal
problems. The ICAOS is a perfect example of short-circuiting a
push by the federal government to regulate state conduct in an
area traditionally reserved to the states, but which is of national
consequence. The passage of "Aimee's Law" illustrates this point
poignantly.152 Congress weighed in on the issue of the interstate
movement of adult offenders by using its grant making and appropriation authority to regulate state conduct precisely because it
viewed the states as unable to successfully address that issue.
Thus, the compact instrument, when properly structured, can
serve the dual purpose of regulating supra-state or national issues
while simultaneously preempting the need for federal action. The
ICAOS provides a firm, but flexible, management tool while allowing the member states collectively to retain authority over suprastate issues and regulate the conduct of individual member states.
Before the ICAOS, the enforcement of compacts was generally
left to either the goodwill of the member states or the Supreme
Court. Either of these approaches can prove to be inadequate, particularly where time is of the essence. Goodwill can only go so far,
and the act of one state suing another state to enforce compact
provisions is highly unusual in our jurisprudential history. Because traditional methods of enforcement appear less than successful, the ICAOS takes an approach that can be used in future
compacts. 153 At the center of this approach, lies the use of the
compact instrument not to regulate specific activity, but to create
a supra-state governance structure that can regulate the affected
areas.
III. CONCLUSION
The use of compacts as instruments to address supra-state,
sub-federal issues and promote uniformity of state policies can be
controversial, particularly where those instruments create inter152. See supra text accompanying note 58.
153. A new juvenile justice compact has recently been drafted modeled
largely on the ICAOS to replace a 1955 compact. See generally http:fl
www.cfg.org (2003). Like the ICAOS, the juvenile compact creates the Interstate Commission for Juveniles and vests that Commission with many of the
same duties and powers as the ICAOS Commission. Id. The juvenile compact
is in draft form and, as of October 2003, has not been adopted by any state,
although it has been introduced in several states. Id.
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state commissions with broad enforcement and rulemaking authority. Yet, this is precisely the virtue of the ICAOS model. Today, states are facing issues that are not confined to geographical
boundaries or jurisdictional lines. As the United States becomes
more integrated socially, culturally and economically, the number
of such issues will only increase. In an odd twist of fate, in an era
of federal authority, states may only be able to preserve their sovereign authority over interstate problems to the extent that they
share their sovereignty and work together through interstate
compacts. Compacts are an attractive alternative, and in some
cases are the only alternative, to federal intervention and regulation. The ICAOS model of a strong interstate commission, comprised of state representatives empowered to regulate both
individual conduct and state behavior, can prove to be an effective
and enforceable means of addressing other commonly shared supra-state, sub-federal issues.

